State v. Lucas, 758 S.E.2d 672

Background

In the early morning hours of November 27, 2011, homeowners at one residence (the Moores) were awakened when someone kicked in the front door; shots were fired and a white Mercury Grand Marquis fled the scene.
Two men (Lucas and Richard) were later observed by a neighbor (Pavel) allegedly "casing" houses and trying car doors in a nearby subdivision; Pavel called 911.
Police stopped a white sedan, detained Lucas and Richard, found tube socks in the car, and observed a shattered sliding window and broken back bedroom window at the Merediths’ (a vacant house). Bricks and a fire-pit bowl were near the broken window; a shard of glass was found on Lucas.
Defendants were charged with first-degree burglary (Moores’ house) and second-degree burglary (Merediths’ house), plus conspiracies. A jury acquitted on first-degree burglary but convicted both defendants of second-degree burglary and conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary.
On appeal defendants challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence on burglary (entry and intent), (2) trial-court jury instructions (no definition of larceny; no instruction on first-degree trespass), (3) restitution amount, and (4) ineffective assistance for not asking for those instructions.
The Court of Appeals vacated the second-degree burglary convictions for lack of proof of entry, remanded to enter convictions for felonious breaking or entering (sufficient intent), vacated restitution for lack of evidence of amount, and rejected defendants’ claims of instructional error and ineffective assistance.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove burglary (entry)	Evidence of broken window, bricks inside, shard of glass on Lucas permits inference of entry.	No proof defendants actually crossed the threshold or used an instrument to commit a felony inside; only window-breaking shown.	Vacated burglary convictions for lack of entry; remand for judgment on felonious breaking/entering (intent proven).
Sufficiency of evidence to prove intent to commit a felony	Conduct (casing houses, trying car doors, breaking window) supports inference of intent to commit larceny.	Argue insufficient to prove felonious intent without actual entry.	Intent to commit felony (larceny) is supported by circumstantial evidence; conviction may be entered for felonious breaking/entering.
Jury instructions — failure to instruct on first-degree trespass	Not expressly argued; State opposed instruction as unsupported by evidence.	Trial court should have given lesser-included offense instruction (first-degree trespass).	No plain error; no evidence presented to raise a reasonable inference of non-felonious purpose, so no obligation to instruct on trespass.
Jury instructions — failure to define "larceny"	The common meaning sufficed given the facts; no ambiguous evidence about intent.	Failure to define larceny was prejudicial and required reversal.	No plain error: under Simpson the need to define larceny depends on case facts; here jurors could apply common meaning.
Restitution amount	Amount was supported at sentencing.	Restitution ($575) lacked evidentiary support of damage value.	Restitution vacated; remand for rehearing because amount lacked competent evidence.
Ineffective assistance for not requesting larceny/trespass instructions	Counsel’s omissions did not cause prejudice because there was no plain error in the instructions.	Failure to request instructions was ineffective assistance.	Denied: because no plain error, defendants cannot show prejudice from counsel’s failure to request instructions.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373 (recognizes standard for reviewing motion to dismiss and substantial evidence)
State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172 (evidence viewed in light most favorable to State on sufficiency review)
State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491 (any slight entry suffices for burglary when instrument used to commit felony inside)
State v. Gibbs, 297 N.C. 410 (entry is going into place after a breach)
State v. Hedrick, 289 N.C. 232 (usual nighttime object of burglary is theft; intent may be inferred absent contrary evidence)
State v. Simpson, 299 N.C. 377 (extent of need to define "larceny" depends on the evidence in the particular case)
State v. Salters, 137 N.C. App. 553 (distinguishable—missing property found in defendant’s possession supported inference of entry)