State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844

Background

State filed information against Daniel J. Lovvorn on Jan. 19, 2018, charging multiple offenses including theft and firearm and drug offenses; trial was originally set for June 14, 2018.
Lovvorn requested continuance of an April 9 pretrial hearing to June 11; trial date initially remained June 14.
State moved to continue trial on June 4 (granted June 12), moving trial to July 17; State moved again on July 5 (granted July 9), and the case was transferred to a judge who later set trial for Sept. 11.
Lovvorn filed a motion for discharge on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds on Sept. 6, 2018; the district court denied the motion after a hearing.
The district court concluded the various continuances produced excludable time under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) and that Barker v. Wingo balancing did not show a Sixth Amendment violation.
Lovvorn appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding Lovvorn waived statutory speedy-trial relief by filing the discharge motion and that no constitutional violation occurred under Barker.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether statutory speedy-trial right was violated under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207	State: Time exclusions under § 29-1207(4) covered the continuances so trial was timely.	Lovvorn: His continuance of the pretrial hearing did not delay trial; therefore § 29-1207(4)(b) does not apply and time expired.	Court: Lovvorn’s requested continuance of the pretrial hearing produced excludable time; additional excluded days made trial timely and his discharge motion waived remaining statutory rights.
Proper computation of excludable time for continuances	State: Excludable time begins day after continuance granted and includes day it ends; includes continuances of pretrial conferences.	Lovvorn: Excludable time under (4)(b) should only apply when the continuance postpones trial itself.	Court: Adopted established rule that excludable time begins day after continuance is granted and includes end day; continuance of pretrial hearing produced excludable days.
Effect of defendant’s motion for discharge on statutory speedy-trial rights	State: Filing a discharge motion that results in continuance beyond statutory period constitutes waiver if denial is affirmed.	Lovvorn: Filing motion preserved his statutory rights and should lead to discharge.	Court: Applied Mortensen rule: because the motion resulted in continuance outside the statutory window, denial (now affirmed) means Lovvorn waived statutory speedy-trial remedy.
Whether constitutional speedy-trial right (Sixth Amendment/Neb. Const.) was violated	State: Delay was justified by witness unavailability; defendant’s objections were pro forma; no prejudice shown.	Lovvorn: Delay (including judge transfer) violated his constitutional right; he was not responsible for State continuances.	Court: Applied Barker v. Wingo factors and found no constitutional violation: length and reason for delay, defendant’s weak assertions, and lack of demonstrated prejudice weigh against relief.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (Neb. 2014) (explains computation of speedy-trial deadlines and effect of excludable periods)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (Neb. 2009) (continuance excludable time runs day after continuance is granted through end date)
State v. Bridgeford, 298 Neb. 156 (Neb. 2017) (discussed pretrial-conference continuance exclusions; court disapproved some language inconsistent with prior precedent)
State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. 145 (Neb. 2004) (no meaningful distinction between “period of delay” and “period of time” in § 29-1207(4))
State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (Neb. 2014) (defendant’s discharge motion can effectuate waiver of statutory speedy-trial rights when it causes continuance beyond statutory period)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (articulates four-factor test for constitutional speedy-trial claims)
State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (Neb. 2014) (speedy trial act provides useful benchmark for constitutional analysis)
State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (Neb. 2016) (applies Barker balancing to state constitutional speedy-trial claims)
State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (Neb. 2017) (standard of review for speedy-trial dismissal rulings)