2018 Ohio 3325
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- In 1986 Charles Lorraine was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder for killing Raymond and Doris Montgomery and was sentenced to death; convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and through subsequent state and federal proceedings.
- Lorraine filed numerous postconviction petitions over the years (including Atkins-related claims); his death sentence was repeatedly litigated in state and federal courts.
- In January 2017 Lorraine moved for leave to file a delayed “Motion for New Mitigation Trial,” relying on Hurst v. Florida (challenging judicial fact‑finding in capital sentencing).
- The trial court denied leave as untimely and, alternatively, found the claim meritless and Ohio’s sentencing scheme constitutionally distinct from Florida’s.
- Lorraine appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied timeliness rules and that Hurst requires a new mitigation/penalty-phase proceeding; the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lorraine) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under Crim.R. 33 for a delayed motion for new trial | Motion is untimely; filed decades after verdict so no basis to grant leave | Motion timely because Hurst was a new, unforeseeable basis; leave should be granted | Court: trial court erred to not analyze "unavoidably prevented," but error harmless because Crim.R. 33 is not the proper vehicle for a new penalty-phase proceeding |
| Proper procedural vehicle: Crim.R. 33 vs postconviction relief (R.C. 2953.21) | Crim.R. 33 governs and Lorraine sought a new mitigation trial under that rule | Claim is constitutional sentencing error and, if construed as collateral attack, must be treated as postconviction relief | Court: claim is not appropriately brought under Crim.R. 33; could be construed as postconviction relief but Lorraine insisted otherwise; court proceeds on his chosen vehicle and denies relief |
| Timeliness/retroactivity under postconviction statutes (R.C. 2953.21/23) | (Implicit) Hurst is a new rule warranting collateral review | Hurst is a new Supreme Court decision; relief should be available retroactively to his collateral challenge | Court: Hurst/Ring not held retroactive by the U.S. Supreme Court; Ring has been held nonretroactive on collateral review (Summerlin), so Lorraine cannot satisfy retroactivity exception |
| Merits: Does Hurst require vacatur or a new penalty-phase under Ohio law? | Hurst establishes jury must find facts increasing punishment; Ohio sentencing relied on judicial factfinding so Hurst requires relief | Ohio’s statutory scheme differs from Florida’s; Ohio already requires certain jury findings and provides independent sentencing safeguards | Court: declines to reach constitutional question as unnecessary; notes Ohio Supreme Court authority holds Ohio scheme materially different and does not violate the Sixth Amendment; Lorraine’s argument fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (Supreme Court held Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment by permitting judge, not jury, to find facts necessary for death sentence)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (jury must find any fact that increases maximum punishment)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing penalty must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively on collateral review)
- State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71 (2006) (procedural remedies and requirements for resentencing when sentencing-entry irregularities occur)
- Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2002) (federal habeas proceedings addressing Lorraine’s death sentence)