753 S.E.2d 425
S.C.2014Background
- The South Carolina Attorney General sought review of two municipal court rulings about whether the AG may prosecute criminal cases in magistrate and municipal (summary) courts; the Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.
- Paul Gwinn was prosecuted in Batesburg-Leesville municipal court on a Criminal Domestic Violence charge; the municipal court allowed prosecution by the Attorney General.
- Michael Morris Long faced a CDV charge in West Columbia municipal court; that court disqualified the Attorney General, ruling art. V, § 24 limited the AG to courts of record.
- The constitutional text at issue states the Attorney General is the chief prosecuting officer “with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record.”
- The central procedural question: whether art. V, § 24 prohibits the Attorney General from personally prosecuting matters in summary (magistrate and municipal) courts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether art. V, § 24 prohibits the Attorney General from prosecuting cases in summary courts | AG: art. V, § 24 does not bar the AG from prosecuting in summary courts; supervisory language refers only to supervision in courts of record | Respondents (Gwinn/Long): text limits AG authority to "courts of record," so AG cannot prosecute in non-record (summary) courts | The Court held art. V, § 24 does not prevent the Attorney General from prosecuting in summary courts; AG may prosecute in magistrate and municipal courts |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. McLeod v. Snipes, 266 S.C. 415, 223 S.E.2d 853 (recognizing the AG as the chief prosecuting officer)
- State v. Nash, 51 S.C. 319, 28 S.E. 946 (1898) (historical recognition that the AG may prosecute in magistrate court)
- Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm’n, 387 S.C. 109, 691 S.E.2d 453 (constitutional provisions should not be construed to impose limits beyond their clear meaning)
- State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (prosecutorial power in art. V, § 24 arises from the constitution and cannot be impaired by legislation)
