State v. Loel, 2014 Ohio 3045

On June 3–4, 2011, officers arrested Matthew Loel after a traffic stop and, during booking, seized two pills; a municipal-court complaint for illegal conveyance of drugs into a detention center was filed June 4, 2011, and dismissed June 17, 2011.
On August 16, 2012, a Franklin County grand jury indicted Loel on the same offense; he was arrested August 26, 2012, arraigned August 29, and released August 31, 2012.
Loel moved February 15, 2013 to dismiss for violation of statutory (R.C. 2945.71) and constitutional speedy-trial rights, arguing the time between the municipal dismissal and later indictment should be counted.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding days between the dismissed municipal complaint and the later indictment are not counted unless the defendant was held or released on bail under Crim.R. 12(I); Loel then pleaded no contest and was sentenced.
On appeal the Tenth District affirmed, holding (1) under State v. Broughton the intermission days when no charges were pending are excluded from the speedy-trial calculation, so Loel could not show a statutory violation, and (2) once those days are excluded the remaining delay was not presumptively prejudicial under the Barker framework, so no constitutional violation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether days between dismissal of municipal complaint and later indictment count toward speedy-trial clock	State: those days do not count when no charges pending (relying on Broughton)	Loel: days should count because the indictment is based on the same facts and the State knew those facts earlier	Court: Days do not count under Broughton absent custody or bail per Crim.R. 12(I); no statutory violation
Whether the total delay violated constitutional speedy-trial rights	State: excluding intermission days, delay was not presumptively prejudicial	Loel: overall delay (~480 days including intermission) was presumptively prejudicial and violated Barker factors	Court: Excluding intermission, delay was under one year and not presumptively prejudicial; Barker factors do not favor Loel; no constitutional violation

State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 253 (1991) (days between dismissal of charges and subsequent indictment generally not counted for speedy-trial purposes when no charge pending)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor balancing test for constitutional speedy-trial claims)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay must be presumptively prejudicial to trigger Barker inquiry)
State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St.3d 300 (2006) (reaffirming aspects of Broughton on counting delay)
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (once charges are dismissed the federal speedy-trial guarantee no longer applies to pre-indictment delay)
State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67 (1989) (addressing whether a second indictment resets speedy-trial timing)
State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108 (1997) (also addressing speedy-trial timing when multiple indictments are involved)