State v. Llewellyn
2021 Ohio 2396
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2021Background
- Appellant Ryan Llewellyn previously pleaded guilty (2016) to gross sexual imposition, was classified a Tier I sex offender, and served a 15‑month sentence.
- In Feb. 2019 a Knox County grand jury indicted Llewellyn on two third‑degree counts under R.C. 2950.05(F)(1): (1) failure to provide notice of a residence address change and (2) failure to provide notice of internet identifiers.
- At re‑registration on Jan. 29, 2019 Llewellyn identified himself as homeless in “Mount Vernon” and signed the registration; local sheriff’s practice required homeless registrants to call daily with their nightly location.
- Investigators testified Llewellyn failed to call in on multiple nights and that three Facebook accounts bearing his name/photos were discoverable but were not listed on his registration; Llewellyn testified he lacked access to some accounts and could not delete them.
- A bench trial resulted in convictions on both counts and a 43‑month sentence; Llewellyn appealed raising sufficiency/manifest‑weight challenges, evidentiary exclusion, and a facial vagueness challenge to the statute.
- The appellate court reversed conviction for the address‑change count, affirmed conviction for the internet‑identifier count, upheld exclusion of Llewellyn’s proffer, and rejected the vagueness challenge.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Llewellyn's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/manifest weight — failure to provide change of address (count 1) | Llewellyn didn’t provide sufficient detail about intended homeless locations and failed to follow sheriff’s required call‑in practice. | Statute does not require nightly calls; he listed "homeless Mount Vernon" and never obtained a fixed address, so no additional reporting duty was triggered. | Reversed — evidence insufficient/weight against conviction because R.C. 2950.05(A)/(F) does not impose a daily call requirement for homeless registrants and no fixed address was ever obtained. |
| Sufficiency/manifest weight — failure to report internet identifiers (count 2) | The Facebook accounts were connected to Llewellyn and undisclosed; statute requires disclosure of internet identifiers registered to the offender. | He lacked access to accounts, could not delete them, and one account was not created by him. | Affirmed — sufficient and not against the manifest weight; Llewellyn admitted registering Facebook accounts previously and R.C. 2950.05(D) covers identifiers registered to him, regardless of current access. |
| Exclusion of proffered evidence (screenshot re: deleting Facebook pages) | Evidence was immaterial to whether accounts were registered to him and thus irrelevant to the statutory disclosure requirement. | The screenshot would show he could not delete or control the accounts, bearing on his ability to comply. | Affirmed exclusion — trial court acted within discretion; ability to delete or access was irrelevant to statutory duty to disclose identifiers registered to him. |
| Facial vagueness of R.C. 2950.05(D) ("internet identifiers") | Statute is sufficiently clear—"internet identifiers" reasonably covers social‑media identifiers; defendant knew to report social‑media in prior registrations. | Statute is vague about which internet identifiers must be listed; ordinary person could not know requirements. | Rejected — statute not unconstitutionally vague on its face; a person of ordinary intelligence would understand "internet identifiers" includes means of online communication such as Facebook. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991) (standard for sufficiency review)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard for sufficiency)
- State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (manifest‑weight standard)
- State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 (2011) (modern treatment of sex‑offender reporting and punitive/remedial analysis)
- State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168 (1991) (facial vagueness / ordinary‑intelligence test)
- State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987) (trial court discretion on admissibility of evidence)
- Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (vagueness doctrine; occasional doubt does not make statute facially vague)