807 N.W.2d 230
S.D.2011Background
- In 1997, Litschewski was convicted by a jury of three offenses: Count II third-degree rape (1989), Count I first-degree rape (1991), and Count III sexual contact with a child (1996).
- The circuit court sentenced Count I to 7.5 years, Count II to 12.5 years, and Count III to 7.5 years; it ordered Count II to run consecutive to Count I and Count III to run consecutive to Counts I and II.
- Litschewski appealed the conviction; this Court affirmed the convictions.
- In 2010, he moved to vacate or modify an illegal sentence, arguing the court lacked authority to make Count II run consecutive to Count I because Count II occurred first in time.
- The circuit court denied the motion; Litschewski timely appealed, challenging both timeliness and the legality of the consecutive sentence under the then-applicable SDCL 22-6-6.1.
- The Court held the appeal timely because the denial was an order, not a judgment, and remanded to address the illegal-consecutive-sentence issue under the 1983 amended version of SDCL 22-6-6.1 which governed sentencing at the time of Litschewski’s 1997 sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeal from the denial | Litschewski argues the appeal was timely because the decision was an order, not a judgment. | State agrees timeliness if the decision is an order. | Timely; decision treated as an order, triggering a 30-day window from notice. |
| Authority to impose consecutive sentence for a prior offense | Count II (1989) should not be consecutive to Count I (1991) because it occurred first in time under the 1983 SDCL 22-6-6.1. | The statutorily broad grant allowed consecutive sentences for offenses and offenses; combinable with the later offense. | Unlawful; under the 1983 amended SDCL 22-6-6.1, a consecutive sentence could not be imposed for a prior offense; reverse and remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Goulding, 2011 S.D. 25, 799 N.W.2d 412 (S.D. 2011) (timeliness and jurisdiction under SDCL 23A-32-15; order vs judgment distinction)
- State v. Arguello, 1996 S.D. 57, 548 N.W.2d 463 (S.D. 1996) (interpretation of SDCL 22-6-6.1; subsequent offense concept)
- State v. Meyers, 1997 S.D. 115, 571 N.W.2d 847 (S.D. 1997) (application of 1983 amendment to SDCL 22-6-6.1 regarding consecutive sentences)
- State v. Perovich, 2001 S.D. 96, 632 N.W.2d 12 (S.D. 2001) (consecutive sentences under 1983 amendment; interpretation of limitations)
- State v. Sieler, 1996 S.D. 114, 554 N.W.2d 477 (S.D. 1996) (consecutive sentences for crimes within same time frame; limits under prior rule)
- In Iverson, State v. Iverson, 269 N.W.2d 390 (S.D. 1978) (final judgment vs order timing for notices of appeal (historical precedence))
