State v. Lisenbee, 505 P.3d 523

Lisenbee violently assaulted Rebecca in his apartment, inflicting catastrophic head and facial injuries that nearly killed her; police found a bloody hammer and both parties covered in blood.
The State charged Lisenbee with attempted murder, aggravated kidnapping, mayhem, and assault; a jury convicted him of attempted murder, aggravated kidnapping, and assault.
The trial court instructed the jury that attempted murder required proof the defendant "intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death," and read the amended attempt statute language allowing conviction on either intent or awareness that conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result.
On appeal Lisenbee argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions because, he said, State v. Casey required an intentional (not merely knowing) mental state for attempted murder.
The court found the Legislature had amended the attempt statute after Casey to permit conviction based on a knowing mental state when causing a particular result is an element of the crime; thus the instructions matched the law in effect at the time of the offense.
The court also noted Lisenbee invited any plain-error complaint by proposing the same instruction, and waived a late-asserted claim about the charging document by raising it first in a reply brief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions that allowed conviction based on a "knowing" mental state	Lisenbee: Casey requires intentional mens rea for attempted murder; the instruction lowered the required culpability, so counsel should have objected	State: The attempt statute was amended in 2004 to permit a knowing attempt when causing a particular result is an element; the instruction correctly followed the law	Court: Statutory amendment superseded Casey; instructions were correct; counsel not deficient (no ineffective assistance)
Whether the trial court committed plain error in giving the instruction	Lisenbee: Court erred in instructing on knowing mens rea	State: Lisenbee invited the instruction by proposing same language at trial, so plain-error review is precluded	Court: Plain-error claim not considered because of invited error / waiver
Whether counsel erred by not forcing the State to prove the mens rea alleged in the charging information	Lisenbee (raised in reply): Information alleged "intentionally attempted" so State should have proven that specific mens rea	State: (Respondent did not have chance to respond)	Court: Issue waived because first raised in reply brief; not reached

State v. Casey, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2003) (held attempted murder required intentional mens rea under the pre-amendment attempt statute)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-pronged ineffective-assistance standard)
State v. Beckering, 346 P.3d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (appellate standard for reviewing ineffective-assistance claims first raised on appeal)
State v. Whytock, 469 P.3d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 2020) (discusses counsel-performance and prejudice prongs)
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (invited-error doctrine precludes appealing instructions a party requested)