83 A.3d 546
R.I.2014Background
- Defendant Linda A. Diamante was charged in 1994 with felony assault with a dangerous weapon (Count One) and willful or malicious injury to property (Count Two).
- Count One was dismissed in 1995 in exchange for a plea to Count Two; she received probation and restitution.
- In March 2004, Diamante moved to seal the records for both counts; the motion was denied in February 2005 by a Superior Court justice.
- Diamante appealed only as to Count One, relying on § 12-1-12.1(a) for sealing relief; the Count Two denial was not appealed.
- The issue centers on the interaction of Rhode Island General Laws § 12-1-12(a) (destruction/sealing related to exoneration) and § 12-1-12.1(a) (sealing for exoneration of all counts).
- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirming the Superior Court held that sealing under § 12-1-12.1(a) requires exoneration of all counts; there was no conflict between the statutes, and the motion to seal as to Count One was properly denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 12-1-12.1(a) requires exoneration of all counts to seal records | Diamante contends § 12-1-12.1(a) allows sealing if exonerated of all counts; she argues conflict with § 12-1-12(a) | State argues plain language requires exoneration of all counts; no conflict with § 12-1-12(a) and records sealing is discretionary only to all counts | § 12-1-12.1(a) requires exoneration of all counts; no sealing without all counts exonerated; denial affirmed |
| Whether § 12-1-12(a) is mandatory and conflicts with § 12-1-12.1(a) | Diamante asserts a conflict making § 12-1-12(a) mandatory regardless of § 12-1-12.1(a) | State argues no conflict; the statutes apply to different records and align to require compliance with § 12-1-12.1(a) | No conflict; § 12-1-12(a) requires sealing consistent with § 12-1-12.1; court properly applied § 12-1-12.1(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Calise, 478 A.2d 198 (R.I. 1984) (plain reading governs when language is pellucid)
- State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029 (R.I. 2005) (court cannot rewrite statute when language is unambiguous)
- Graff, 17 A.3d 1005 (R.I. 2011) (plain-language interpretation governs statutory analysis)
- DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 26 A.3d 585 (R.I. 2011) (use plain meaning unless ambiguity exists)
- Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527 (R.I. 2012) (statutory interpretation starts with plain language)
- State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 777 (R.I. 1996) (presumption of legislative intent in plain language)
- State v. Reis, 430 A.2d 749 (R.I. 1981) (avoid rewriting statutes to discern intent)
- Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (U.S. 2005) (court cannot rewrite statute enacted by legislature)