State v. Liming
945 N.W.2d 882
Neb.2020Background
- Oct. 16, 2018: State filed a five-count information against James Liming (assault, weapons, unlawful discharge, firearm use, criminal mischief).
- Liming filed a plea in abatement; court ruled on Jan. 22, 2019, dismissing one count without prejudice; amended information filed Jan. 30, 2019.
- Several continuances (arraignment and pretrial) were granted; parties agree the resulting excluded days under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) total 154 days, which alone would extend the 6-month trial deadline to Sept. 17, 2019.
- Court ordered a settlement conference for June 18, 2019; State requested (and Liming’s counsel consented to) a continuance on May 23 to July 9, 2019; counsel exchange confirming non-objection was admitted at hearing.
- Liming filed a motion for absolute discharge Sept. 23, 2019, arguing the State violated the 6-month speedy-trial statute; district court denied the motion.
- Supreme Court held the settlement-conference continuance (May 25–July 9) produced 46 excluded days under § 29-1207(4)(b), so the State timely brought Liming to trial (new deadline Nov. 2, 2019); affirmed denial of discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether delay from continuance of a settlement conference (consented to by defense counsel) is excluded under § 29-1207(4)(b) | Liming: a settlement conference is not a recognized "proceeding" in criminal cases, so its continuance should not produce excluded time | State: § 29-1207(4)(b) excludes any delay from a continuance granted at defendant’s or counsel’s request/consent, regardless of the event’s statutory status | Court: § 29-1207(4)(b) applies; the continuance produced 46 excluded days, so no speedy-trial violation |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019) (broad construction of § 29-1207(4)(b) excluding delays from continuances consented to by defense)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (2014) (recognizing statutory right to speedy trial under § 29-1207)
- State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797, 587 N.W.2d 384 (1998) (definition of “proceeding” for § 29-1207(4)(a) purposes)
- State ex rel. Peterson v. Creative Comm. Promotions, 302 Neb. 606, 924 N.W.2d 664 (2019) (statutory interpretation principles)
- In re Estate of Radford, 304 Neb. 205, 933 N.W.2d 595 (2019) (statutory construction prohibiting unwarranted readings into plain language)