State v. Lile, 93035-0

Background

In 2013 Travis Lile punched Christopher Rowles and then struck Amanda Millman when she intervened; Officer Jeremy Woodward attempted to arrest Lile and was struck during a struggle. Lile admitted he threw the first punch and was charged with multiple assaults and resisting arrest.
At a January 22, 2014 status hearing Judge Ira Uhrig granted a one‑week continuance after the parties requested it; Lile later filed a timely affidavit of prejudice against Judge Uhrig before Uhrig ruled on a severance motion. Uhrig deemed the affidavit untimely, ruling the continuance was a discretionary order, and denied the affidavit and the severance motion.
Scheduling conflicts later required transfer of the case to Judge Deborra Garrett, who presided over the trial; Lile did not renew his severance motion before Garrett. Garrett excluded certain ER 404(b) evidence pretrial and later limited cross‑examination impeachment under ER 608(b) of Rowles based on a protection‑order petition filed by an ex‑girlfriend.
A jury convicted Lile on all counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the continuance ruling was nondiscretionary but that any error in denying the affidavit of prejudice was harmless because Uhrig did not try the case and Lile could have renewed severance; it also affirmed the limitation on impeachment.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review on (1) whether a judge’s ruling on an agreed continuance is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050 (timeliness of affidavit of prejudice) and (2) whether the trial court abused discretion in limiting impeachment of Rowles under ER 608(b).

Issues

Issue	Pet'r (Lile) Argument	State Argument	Held
Whether a ruling on an agreed continuance is a discretionary ruling making an affidavit of prejudice untimely	Agreed continuance at a status hearing is a calendaring matter, not a discretionary ruling under RCW 4.12.050, so the affidavit was timely	A continuance ruling—even if agreed/unopposed—requires judicial consideration of case management factors and is discretionary, so the affidavit was untimely	Court held a ruling on an agreed continuance is discretionary for RCW 4.12.050 purposes; Uhrig was qualified to rule on severance (affirmed trial court)
Whether denial of the affidavit of prejudice required reversal when the judge who was the subject of the affidavit did not try the case	Denial was prejudicial and erroneous; Dixon-type concerns mean a change of judge is a matter of right	Because Uhrig did not preside at trial and Lile failed to renew the severance motion before the trial judge, any error was harmless	Court held that ordinarily denial of a timely affidavit is reversible error, but here Uhrig was qualified and no reversal required because Uhrig’s continuance ruling was discretionary (majority); Court affirms trial outcome
Whether trial court abused discretion by excluding impeachment of Rowles with allegations in a protection‑order petition (ER 608(b))	Rowles’s statements that he was “not a fighter” opened the door; allegations of prior domestic violence directly impeach that claim and bear on credibility	The protection‑order allegations were collateral, factually different from mutual combat with a stranger, and not probative of truthfulness for purposes of ER 608(b)	Majority: No abuse of discretion—Judge Garrett reasonably found the allegations collateral and irrelevant; limitation on cross‑examination affirmed
Whether limiting cross‑examination on prior domestic violence violated confrontation rights	Limitation violated confrontation clause because the State elicited Rowles’s peacefulness and that opened the door to impeachment; exclusion was constitutional error (but harmless)	Any limitation was within trial court’s discretion to exclude marginal or prejudicial inquiry; even if error, the record contained overwhelming untainted evidence of guilt	Several concurring opinions: exclusion was error under confrontation clause, but constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions stand

Key Cases Cited

State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30 (Wash. 2007) (party may disqualify judge for prejudice under RCW 4.12.050)
In re Recall of Lindquist, 172 Wn.2d 120 (Wash. 2011) (timeliness rule: affidavit must be filed before any discretionary ruling)
State v. Parra, 122 Wn.2d 590 (Wash. 1993) (substance of request controls whether a ruling invokes judicial discretion)
State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609 (Wash. 1990) (ruling on stipulated continuance is discretionary)
State v. Espinoza, 112 Wn.2d 819 (Wash. 1989) (continuance requested by defense and joined by State is discretionary)
State v. Dixon, 74 Wn.2d 700 (Wash. 1968) (timing of affidavit and concerns about which judge will try the case)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (cross‑examination essential for testing witness credibility)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (limits on confrontation clause testimony and harmless‑error framework)
State v. O'Connor, 155 Wn.2d 335 (Wash. 2005) (ER 608(b) inquiry—trial court discretion to permit specific‑instance impeachment)
State v. Gefeller, 76 Wn.2d 449 (Wash. 1969) (opening the door doctrine in impeachment)