State v. Liaw, 2016 SD 31

On Oct. 24, 2014, Jeremiah Liaw grabbed and forcibly moved 57‑year‑old Angela Calin from her porch, allegedly holding her by the arm/neck, dragging her about a block, and attempting to shove her into traffic; Calin escaped and called 911.
Police found Liaw nearby; officers observed slurred speech and unsteady balance and a portable breath test registered .38; Liaw was charged with first‑ and second‑degree kidnapping, aggravated assault, and criminal trespass (acquitted of assault; time served on trespass).
At trial Liaw sought jury instructions defining specific intent and on voluntary intoxication (to negate specific intent). Liaw presented expert testimony about high‑level alcohol effects and tolerance but did not testify.
The trial court treated second‑degree kidnapping as a general‑intent crime, denied the specific‑intent instruction, and gave a pared voluntary‑intoxication instruction omitting references to specific intent; the jury convicted on second‑degree kidnapping.
Liaw appealed, arguing second‑degree kidnapping requires specific intent and the court erred by denying his requested instructions on specific intent and the effect of voluntary intoxication.
The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding SDCL 22‑19‑1.1 (second‑degree kidnapping) is a specific‑intent offense and Liaw was prejudiced by the incomplete intoxication instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is second‑degree kidnapping a specific‑intent crime?	State: statute prohibits the act and does not require a separate mental state beyond the act (general intent).	Liaw: statute’s “with any of the following purposes” language shows Legislature required purpose to inflict injury or terrorize (specific intent).	Held: specific intent required — must prove purpose to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize.
Did the trial court err by refusing a specific‑intent jury instruction?	State: given instructions tracked statute and sufficiently covered elements.	Liaw: omission deprived jury of an essential element and misled jurors about required mental state.	Held: court abused discretion by failing to instruct on specific intent.
Was the voluntary‑intoxication instruction adequate?	State: partial instruction and counsel argument cured any defect.	Liaw: court removed language tying intoxication to negating specific intent, undermining his diminished‑capacity defense.	Held: instruction was incomplete; proper intoxication instruction tied to specific intent was required.
Was the error harmless? (Prejudice)	State: evidence and counsel argument showed intent; no prejudice.	Liaw: significant evidence of extreme intoxication made the specific‑intent issue outcome‑determinative.	Held: prejudice shown—error was not harmless; reversal and remand required.

State v. Schouten, 707 N.W.2d 820 (S.D. 2005) (discussing specific vs. general intent and application to statutory wording)
State v. Taecker, 661 N.W.2d 712 (S.D. 2003) (defining specific intent as intent beyond the physical act)
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (distinguishing MPC terms "purpose" and "knowledge" and relating them to specific/general intent)
State v. Rash, 294 N.W.2d 416 (S.D. 1980) (describing the distinction between specific and general intent)
State v. Jacquith, 272 N.W.2d 90 (S.D. 1978) (holding larceny is a specific‑intent crime and jury should be instructed accordingly)
State v. Soft, 329 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1983) (reversing grand‑theft conviction for failure to instruct on specific intent)
State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121 (S.D. 1984) (discussing harmless‑error review where intoxication evidence is minimal)
State v. Vargas, 869 N.W.2d 150 (S.D. 2015) (reversing where specific‑intent element was not instructed and outcome was uncertain)