203 A.3d 1177
Vt.2018Background
- Liana Roy was tried for custodial interference after taking her four-year-old daughter, then in DCF custody, on an out-of-state trip without DCF permission.
- After the State rested and again after all evidence, Roy moved for judgment of acquittal under V.R.Cr.P. 29; both motions were denied and the jury convicted.
- Roy moved under V.R.Cr.P. 29(c) / 33 to set aside the verdict; the trial court granted a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, reasoning that when DCF is custodian the State must produce a court order detailing parent–child contact parameters to support a custodial-interference conviction.
- The State appealed; this Court initially reversed the trial court, ordered reinstatement of the conviction, and remanded for sentencing.
- The Court sua sponte stayed its mandate to consider whether the State had a statutory right to appeal a post-guilty-verdict judgment of acquittal under 13 V.S.A. § 7403 and whether extraordinary relief under V.R.A.P. 21 was appropriate.
- The Supreme Court concluded the State had no statutory or common-law right to appeal the post-verdict judgment of acquittal and declined to grant extraordinary relief, withdrew its earlier opinion, and dismissed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State has a statutory right to appeal a post-guilty-verdict judgment of acquittal under 13 V.S.A. § 7403 | State: § 7403 permits appealing an order dismissing an information; a post-verdict judgment of acquittal is functionally such a dismissal and does not violate double jeopardy | Roy: § 7403 does not list judgments of acquittal; absent explicit statutory authorization the State has no right to appeal | No. The statute’s plain language and history do not authorize appeals of judgments of acquittal; State has no common-law right either |
| Whether double-jeopardy concerns control the question of statutory appealability | State: allowing appeal here does not violate double jeopardy, so statute should permit review | Roy: statutory limits govern regardless of double jeopardy analysis; lack of statutory grant is dispositive | Double-jeopardy analysis is irrelevant to statutory interpretation; lack of statutory authorization ends the inquiry |
| Whether this Court should grant extraordinary relief under V.R.A.P. 21 to reverse the acquittal despite lack of statutory appeal | State: alternatively requests Rule 21 relief to correct trial-court error and reinstate conviction | Roy: extraordinary relief inappropriate—State did not follow Rule 21 procedures and Legislature chose not to allow such appeals | Denied. Court declines Rule 21 relief, applying a narrow Saari standard and finding no usurpation of power or exceptional circumstances |
| Whether prior practice or legislative history supports State’s position | State: historical cases allowed similar appeals; legislative intent unclear | Roy: 1982 amendment narrowed State appeals and intentionally omitted judgments of acquittal | Court: Legislative amendment after Mills shows intent to limit State appeals; omission of acquittal appeals is deliberate |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (government historically had no common-law right to appeal)
- State v. Mills, 133 Vt. 15 (Vt. 1974) (Court previously allowed State appeal of post-verdict acquittal under prior statute)
- State v. Saari, 152 Vt. 510 (Vt. 1989) (extraordinary relief available only in narrow circumstances; trial court must have usurped power)
- State v. Benjamin, 124 Vt. 20 (Vt. 1963) (State’s appeals in criminal cases are limited to statute)
- State, ex rel. Marsland v. Shintaku, 640 P.2d 289 (Haw. 1982) (declining extraordinary relief where legislature denied government appeals from acquittals)
- Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (recognizing finality of acquittal)