State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 898 N.W.2d 560

Background

In July 2013 Deputy Troy Ruffalo stopped Lewis O. Floyd, Jr. for suspended vehicle registration and learned Floyd had no license or insurance on him. Ruffalo returned to his squad car to draft citations and call dispatch for backup/canine; a cover officer (Officer White) arrived while citations were being prepared.
After reapproaching Floyd (holding Floyd’s ID and citations), Ruffalo asked Floyd to exit the vehicle, asked if Floyd had weapons, and then asked for permission to conduct a search; Floyd said, “yes, go ahead.” A pat-down revealed controlled substances.
Floyd moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the traffic stop was unlawfully extended before the search request (so any consent was invalid); the circuit court denied suppression. Floyd pled no contest to possession with intent to deliver and later alleged ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to call Officer White at the suppression hearing.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding the request that Floyd exit the vehicle was lawful (Mimms), the search request occurred during the stop’s permissible mission, and Floyd voluntarily consented; it also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted review and affirmed the court of appeals: it held the request to search was part of the stop’s mission (officer safety), Floyd was lawfully seized when asked, and his consent was voluntary; counsel’s tactical decision not to call Officer White was not deficient.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Floyd)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the traffic stop was unlawfully extended before the search request	The stop’s mission ended once citations were written; asking for consent after that unlawfully prolonged the seizure, vitiating any consent	The request to step out and to consent related to officer safety and the stop’s mission, so the stop had not ended	Held: No extension — asking Floyd to exit and requesting consent were part of the stop’s mission and did not unlawfully prolong the seizure
Whether Floyd’s consent to the search was voluntary	Consent was not voluntary because Floyd’s ID/citations were withheld and the stop was over (or coercive), so any acquiescence was not valid consent	Consent was given freely and voluntarily (unequivocal “yes”); retention of ID during a lawful stop does not itself invalidate consent	Held: Consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances; evidence need not be suppressed
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not calling Officer White at suppression hearing	White’s testimony would have shown Ruffalo said he was going to search (not asked), proving consent was coerced; counsel’s failure to call him was deficient and prejudicial	Counsel reasonably omitted White as a tactical choice; calling White could have aided the State and counsel presented White’s report in filings	Held: No ineffective assistance — counsel’s decision was a reasonable tactical choice and not prejudicial

Key Cases Cited

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (ordering driver out of vehicle during lawful traffic stop is per se permissible)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (scope of protective frisk; investigatory stop standards)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent must be voluntary under totality of circumstances)
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (traffic-stop "mission" limits permissible duration; unrelated inquiries that measurably extend the stop are unlawful)
Illinois v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (custody alone does not automatically render consent involuntary)
State v. Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675 (Wis. 2007) (Mimms rule applied in Wisconsin)
State v. Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167 (2015) (consent tainted by illegal seizure may be invalid)