262 So. 3d 378
La. Ct. App.2018Background
- March 26, 2014: armed robbery at Dorsey residence; victims Charles Meyers (killed) and Christopher Dorsey (shot) taken from home and transported; shootings occurred after a struggle in a truck. Co-defendants Reed and Holmes participated; Holmes admitted to being the shooter in the Myers killing; Reed testified against Defendant.
- Defendant (Tavis Leonard) was indicted for second-degree murder (Charles Meyers), attempted second-degree murder (Christopher Dorsey), and armed robbery; State tried counts 1–3; jury convicted Defendant of second-degree murder, armed robbery, and lesser-included attempted manslaughter; multiple concurrent lengthy sentences imposed.
- Key evidence: Reed’s testimony implicating Defendant as planner and gun-provider; surveillance video from the residence; cell‑tower records placing Defendant’s phone near the scene around the offense time; ballistics and autopsy confirming multiple shooters and fatal wounds.
- Procedural history: motion for new trial denied; Defendant appealed raising sufficiency, trial-court discretionary rulings (recess, mistrial), and ineffective assistance for not moving to quash after nolle prosequi/reinstitution of charges.
- Trial court denied recess to secure incarcerated witnesses (defense failed to show due diligence or materiality); denied mistrial over prosecutor’s questions referencing other murders; appellate court reviewed sufficiency first and affirmed convictions.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for second-degree murder/attempted manslaughter | Evidence (Reed’s testimony, surveillance, cell‑tower pings, planning/weapon supply) shows Defendant was a principal in armed robbery and foreseeable killings during it | Defendant argued he did not fire any shots, fled before shootings, and lacked specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm | Affirmed: viewed in light most favorable to State, evidence supports felony‑murder/principal liability; specific intent not required for second‑degree murder when killing occurs during armed robbery |
| Trial court refusal to recess to transport incarcerated witnesses | Court had attempted to obtain witnesses; defense failed to show due diligence or materiality of their testimony | Counsel argued witnesses (Holmes, Reed) were necessary and DOC failed to transport them | Affirmed: denial was within court’s discretion because defense did not satisfy continuance/recess standards (La. C.Cr.P. arts. 708, 709) |
| Motion for mistrial after prosecutor referenced other murders not on trial | Prosecutor’s questions did not directly accuse Defendant of uncharged murders in context and were responsive to Defendant’s testimony about his family deaths | Defendant argued reference to other murders violated pretrial order and warranted mistrial under La. C.Cr.P. art. 770 | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; statements were not direct accusations and court found any error harmless under circumstances |
| Ineffective assistance for not moving to quash reinstituted indictment after nolle prosequi | Reinstitution was timely and lawful; no showing dismissal was to avoid statute of limitations or that delay prejudiced Defendant | Defendant argued counsel should have moved to quash because charges were reinstituted after nolle prosequi and not resubmitted to grand jury | Affirmed: no prejudice shown and reinstitution occurred within statutory periods; counsel’s omission did not establish Strickland prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard under a reasonable‑juror review)
- Mussall v. State, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988) (discusses whole-record review and presumption that trier of fact acted rationally)
- Hearold v. State, 603 So.2d 731 (La. 1992) (ordering sufficiency review before other trial-error claims)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Batiste v. State, 939 So.2d 1245 (La. 2006) (prosecutor’s authority to nolle prosequi and reinstitute charges)