State v. Leon-Simaj, 300 Neb. 317

Defendant Antonio Leon‑Simaj was charged with first‑degree sexual assault and possession of child pornography based on a relationship with a minor (E.Z.).
At trial defense counsel impeached E.Z. and then asked whether she had been arrested for burglary/stealing; the prosecutor objected as improper character/evidence of other crimes.
Outside the jury, the court and parties discussed whether a curative instruction would suffice; the prosecutor argued it would not and suggested mistrial; the court indicated it would declare a mistrial.
Defense counsel never expressly objected to the court’s sua sponte consideration/decision to declare a mistrial; he apologized and submitted cases claiming curative instructions could work and later, after researching, contended his questioning had been proper.
The district court discharged the jury and later denied defendant’s plea in bar (double jeopardy), reasoning the improper questioning warranted mistrial; on appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding defendant implicitly consented to the mistrial by failing to timely and explicitly object.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Leon‑Simaj)	Held
Whether retrial is barred by Double Jeopardy after a court‑declared mistrial	Defense argues defendant impliedly consented to the mistrial by failing to object when given opportunity, so retrial allowed	Defendant argues counsel did not expressly consent and later showed the questioning was proper (so no manifest necessity for mistrial)	Court held defendant implicitly consented by silence when given opportunity to object; retrial not barred
Whether mistrial was warranted by manifest necessity (i.e., whether the error was incurable)	State contends defendant’s question elicited inadmissible, prejudicial testimony that could not be cured by instruction	Defendant contends the question was proper under impeachment rules and curative instruction cases made available to the court	Court did not need to reach manifest necessity because implied consent controls; affirmed denial of plea in bar on consent ground

United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (defendant’s consent to mistrial removes double jeopardy bar)
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) ("manifest necessity" standard for mistrial declared over objection)
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (retrial barred where abrupt discharge left no opportunity to object)
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (reprosecution barred when prosecutorial conduct intended to provoke mistrial)
State v. Bedolla, 298 Neb. 736 (Neb. 2018) (Double Jeopardy principles and reprosecution analyses)