State v. Leon, 292 P.3d 493

Defendant Mario Leon was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and selling alcohol to a minor, and was placed on supervised probation with conditions including no alcohol and counseling.
Because of a prior sex offense, Leon was placed under sex offender supervision per NM Corrections Department policy and signed the SOSBC.
Following multiple probation violations, including alcohol in the home and missed counseling, the State petitioned to revoke probation and sought habitual offender enhancement.
The district court revoked probation, sentenced Leon under the Habitual Offender Statute, and a notice of appeal was filed about 62 days later, later deemed untimely.
The Court of Appeals ultimately ruled it could hear the untimely appeal and addressed whether the probation conditions were lawful and reasonable, whether the revocation was supported by sufficient evidence, and whether habitual enhancement was proper.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the untimely appeal can be heard.	Leon argues untimely filing should be excused by ineffective assistance presumption.	Leon contends the delay should be excused or treated as ineffective assistance.	Yes, appeal heard despite untimeliness.
Whether the SOSBC sex-offender conditions were lawfully imposed.	State contends the probation order reasonably incorporated SOSBC terms.	Leon argues SOSBC terms were not stated in the judgment and order.	SOSBC conditions were lawful and sufficiently incorporated.
Whether the probation violations were proven by sufficient evidence.	State must prove violations by a reasonable certainty.	Leon argues insufficiency of evidence for certain violations.	Sufficient evidence supported revocation.
Whether habitual offender enhancement was proper.	State applied habitual offender statute based on prior felony conviction.	Leon challenges use of a prior juvenile-adjudicated offense for enhancement.	Enhancement proper; statute applicable to felonies regardless of source.
Whether due process was violated by the delay in revocation proceedings.			Delay did not violate due process; no prejudice shown.

Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M. 265, 403 P.2d 701 (1965) (right to counsel at revocation hearings; due process standard)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (case-by-case determination for counsel in probation revocation)
Barnett v. Malley, 90 N.M. 633, 567 P.2d 482 (1977) (adopts Gagnon reasoning for parole revocation where applicable)
State v. Duran, 105 N.M. 231, 731 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1986) (conclusive presumption of ineffective assistance for untimely appeal in certain contexts)
State v. Martinez, 108 N.M. 604, 775 P.2d 1321 (Ct. App. 1989) (standard for revocation evidence; burden on state)
State v. Williams, 2006-NMCA-092, 140 N.M. 194, 141 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2006) (reasonableness relation of probation conditions to offense/rehabilitation)
State v. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137, 136 N.M. 614, 103 P.3d 54 (Ct. App. 2004) (conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation; abuse of discretion standard)
State v. Smith, 2000-NMCA-101, 129 N.M. 738, 13 P.3d 470 (Ct. App. 2000) (habitat on prior felonies; limits on applying habitual offender)
State v. Guthrie, 2011-NMSC-014, 150 N.M. 84, 257 P.3d 904 (N.M. 2011) (probation revocation rights; fundamental liberty interest)