State v. Lente, 453 P.3d 416

Defendant Jesse Lente was indicted on 38 counts alleging repeated sexual abuse of his stepdaughter M.C.; 26 sex-abuse counts survived a directed verdict and resulted in convictions (CSP and CSCM across multiple six‑month intervals).
At trial M.C. (the sole child witness) testified generally that abuse occurred frequently over ~40 months (about 2–3 times per week), described types of acts (fellatio, digital penetration, touching) and estimated high totals for each act; M.C.’s mother witnessed one incident of fellatio.
Lente appealed; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Later he filed habeas petitions arguing (1) the indictment contained indistinguishable “carbon‑copy” counts violating double jeopardy (relying on Valentine and Dominguez), and (2) M.C.’s generic testimony was insufficient to sustain multiple convictions.
The district court granted habeas relief, vacating most sex‑abuse convictions and retaining only one conviction per offense type, finding both the indictment and the testimony problematic for double jeopardy purposes.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed: it held the six‑month interval charging scheme adequately differentiated counts (no carbon‑copy problem) and that M.C.’s testimony met the applicable sufficiency standards for multiple convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lente)	Held
Whether the indictment contained impermissible "carbon‑copy" counts that violated double jeopardy	The indictment differentiated counts by specific sex act and discrete six‑month date ranges; that is adequate to provide notice and prevent double jeopardy	Counts were essentially identical and undifferentiated (like Valentine/Dominguez), so convictions on multiple counts violate double jeopardy	The Court held the six‑month intervals and specific-act allegations avoided carbon‑copy problems; indictment was sufficiently specific — no double jeopardy violation from the charging document
Whether M.C.’s generalized testimony was sufficient to support multiple, discrete convictions	M.C.’s testimony described acts, estimated frequencies, and gave general time frames; under precedents (Jones) that is sufficient for multiple convictions in resident‑molester cases	Testimony was too generic; a child’s undifferentiated account cannot sustain multiple convictions and retrial should be barred	The Court applied a clarified sufficiency framework (Jones three‑part approach) and held M.C.’s testimony was sufficient to support each conviction; multiple convictions did not violate double jeopardy

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (indictment must give notice and enable pleading former jeopardy; informs inquiry into "carbon‑copy" counts)
Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (indictment with numerous identical counts lacked minimal differentiation; dismissed duplicate child‑abuse counts)
State v. Dominguez, 178 P.3d 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (applied Valentine; dismissed counts that bill of particulars could not tie to distinct incidents)
People v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1990) (resident‑molester sufficiency rule: victim must (1) describe the proscribed acts sufficiently, (2) describe number of acts with reasonable certainty, and (3) give general time periods)
State v. Herron, 805 P.2d 624 (N.M. 1991) (unit‑of‑prosecution analysis for repeated penetrations during a single assaultive episode)