State v. Lemanski, 201 Conn.App. 360

Trooper Matthew Costella stopped defendant Robert Lemanski after observing equipment and lane‑use violations; dashcam video was admitted at trial.
Costella smelled alcohol, observed slurred speech and glassy eyes, and the defendant failed three standardized field sobriety tests.
Steven (the defendant’s son) told Costella the defendant had two drinks that evening; Steven was not called as a witness.
At the station the defendant repeatedly vacillated about taking a breath test, ultimately refusing breath testing and requesting a blood test (which is less practical within the statutory two‑hour window).
The jury convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence; he appealed, raising (1) a Confrontation Clause challenge to Costella’s testimony about Steven’s statement and (2) a challenge to jury instructions about inferences from refusal to submit to a breath test and consciousness of guilt.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admitting Costella’s testimony that Steven said the defendant had two drinks violated the Confrontation Clause	State: testimony was cumulative, less probative than officer observations and dashcam, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Lemanski: the statement was testimonial hearsay admitted without opportunity to cross‑examine, violating the Sixth Amendment	Even if testimonial hearsay, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Golding because other strong evidence (odor, appearance, failed tests, dashcam) made Steven’s remark cumulative
Whether the court erred in instructing the jury that it could "make any reasonable inference" from a refusal to take a breath test and in giving a consciousness‑of‑guilt instruction	State: instruction substantially complied with §14‑227a(e), counsel was given and accepted proposed charges (implicit waiver), and evidence of vacillation/refusal supported the consciousness‑of‑guilt instruction	Lemanski: the instruction was contrary to statute, diluted the state’s burden of proof, and was unsupported because he agreed to a blood test	Instruction upheld: language substantially complied with statute and, read in full, did not mislead jury; defendant implicitly waived due process claim by accepting charges; consciousness‑of‑guilt instruction was factually supported and not plain error

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (Conn. 1989) (framework for review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (Conn. 2015) (modification/clarification of Golding standard)
State v. Gordon, 84 Conn. App. 519 (Conn. App. 2004) (approved instruction permitting "any reasonable inference" from breath‑test refusal)
State v. McCarthy, 63 Conn. App. 433 (Conn. App. 2001) (permitting jury to draw reasonable inferences from refusal)
State v. Barlow, 30 Conn. App. 36 (Conn. App. 1993) (upheld submission of refusal evidence and consciousness‑of‑guilt instruction)
State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 (Conn. 2011) (counsel’s acceptance of proposed jury instructions can constitute implicit waiver of challenge)
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332 Conn. 720 (Conn. 2019) (model jury instructions are instructive but not binding)