State v. Leistiko, 282 P.3d 857

The State charged Leistiko with three counts of first-degree rape, each involving a different victim from separate incidents.
The State offered testimony from a fourth woman (uncharged misconduct) to show lack of consent by the three victims.
The trial court admitted the fourth-woman testimony, and the jury convicted Leistiko on two of the three first-degree rape counts.
The Court of Appeals affirmed admission of the fourth-woman testimony; Leistiko petitioned for review.
The court reverses in part: a) the fourth-woman testimony was improperly admitted under OEC 404(3) for all purposes; b) the two first-degree rape convictions are reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings.
The procedural posture involves joinder of counts and the severability considerations under ORS 132.560.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the fourth woman's testimony was admissible under OEC 404(3).	Leistiko contends it probative for propensity to commit rape and not for legitimate purposes.	Leistiko argues the evidence was inadmissible to prove any charged offense or intent due to lack of proper purpose and risk of prejudice.	The court holds the evidence was not admissible for any proper purpose and was prejudicial.
Whether the fourth-woman testimony could prove Leistiko's intent or plan in committing the charged rapes.	State argues it shows intent or a plan to obtain sexual access without consent.	Leistiko argues the similarities are insufficient to prove intent or a plan beyond propensity.	The court rejects both when applying the doctrine of chances; insufficient similarity to prove intent or plan.
Whether admission of the fourth-woman testimony requires reversal of the first-degree rape convictions.	State asserts potential impact on multiple convictions.	Leistiko contends any prejudice requires reversal of convictions affected.	The erroneous admission required reversal of the two first-degree rape convictions and remand.

State v. Johnson, 340 Or 319 (2006) (evidence of uncharged misconduct may prove a plan or method to obtain consent)
State v. Gailey, 301 Or 563 (1986) (prior bad acts cannot prove intent where the act itself is at issue)
Johns, 301 Or 535 (1986) (doctrine of chances; complex pattern may prove intent or plan; distinction from modus operandi)
State v. Marshall, 350 Or 208 (2011) (causal link between forcible compulsion and sexual contact; definition of forcible compulsion)
State v. Garrett, 350 Or 1 (2011) (OEC 404(3) framework for admissibility of other-crimes evidence)