State v. Legg, 380 P.3d 360

In 2011 John L. Legg Jr. pleaded guilty in two cases to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; the court suspended concurrent 0–5 year sentences and placed him on 24 months’ probation with 180 days jail as a condition.
AP&P alleged multiple probation violations shortly after his release; the district court found three violations, revoked probation, and ordered execution of the suspended sentences.
On direct appeal (Legg I) this court affirmed one violation (failure to be cooperative/ truthful) but remanded two other findings (drug possession and failure to establish residence) for further explanation because the record was inadequate.
On remand the State dropped the two remanded allegations and proceeded solely on the affirmed violation; the successor judge concluded that the single affirmed violation alone justified revocation and reinstated the original sentences.
By the time this appeal was briefed Legg had served the reinstated sentences and was released, prompting the State’s argument that the appeal is moot; the district court’s revocation could not practically be undone.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the appeal is moot	Legg: collateral consequences (record blemish affecting future PSR, plea offers, sentencing) keep controversy live; court should address mandate compliance	State: Legg has served reinstated sentences; vacating revocation would have no practical effect; collateral consequences not presumed for probation revocations	Court: Appeal is moot; Legg failed to show actual, non‑speculative collateral legal consequences applicable to a probation revocation
Whether prior decisions (Allen and Warner) permitting a presumption of collateral consequences for probation revocations remain good law	Legg: Allen and Warner correctly allowed presumption; should control	State: Allen and Warner were wrongly decided; collateral‑consequences presumption applies only to challenges to convictions	Court: Disavows the mootness holdings in Allen and Warner; follows precedent that presumes collateral consequences only for challenges to convictions, not for probation revocations

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (collateral‑consequences doctrine requires a concrete, continuing injury beyond ended incarceration)
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (discusses presumptive collateral consequences of convictions)
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971) (survey of legal disabilities states may attach to convictions)
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981) (Utah adopts Sibron; presumption of collateral consequences applies to convictions, not other administrative actions)
Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582 (Utah 2012) (mootness is jurisdictional and non‑discretionary)
State v. Black, 355 P.3d 981 (Utah 2015) (appellate courts generally will not resolve moot issues)
State v. Allen, 353 P.3d 1266 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (previous panel presumed collateral consequences for probation revocation; disavowed here)
State v. Warner, 347 P.3d 846 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (previous panel presumed collateral consequences for probation revocation; disavowed here)