State v. Legg
2018 UT 12
| Utah | 2018Background
- John L. Legg pled guilty to two third-degree felonies, received concurrent suspended sentences (0–5 years) and 24 months probation, and later had probation revoked in both cases.
- The Utah Court of Appeals initially reversed in part and remanded for further evidentiary consideration; on remand the State dropped two violations and the district court reinstated prison commitments based on one sustained violation.
- Legg appealed the revocation in one case; while his second appeal was pending he served the resurrected sentence and was released from prison.
- The court of appeals dismissed the pending appeal as moot, overturning two of its prior panels (Warner and Allen) and holding that collateral legal consequences are not presumed for probation revocations.
- The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether the court of appeals properly overruled its own precedent and (2) whether collateral consequences are presumed in probation-revocation appeals.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: a panel may overrule prior court-of-appeals panels under Eldridge factors, and probation-revocation appeals become moot when the sentence is served unless the defendant shows actual collateral legal consequences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court of appeals panel may overturn prior panels under horizontal stare decisis | Legg argued the court of appeals improperly overruled its precedent | State defended panel’s authority to re-evaluate prior panel holdings | Court: panels may overrule prior panels using Eldridge factors; court of appeals properly applied them |
| Whether collateral legal consequences are presumed when a defendant’s probation revocation appeal becomes moot because sentence was served | Legg argued collateral consequences should be presumed (like in criminal conviction appeals) so the appeal is not moot | State argued presumptions do not extend to probation revocations; defendant must show actual consequences | Court: No presumption for probation revocations; defendant must show actual, non‑speculative collateral legal consequences |
| Whether Legg identified actual collateral legal consequences sufficient to avoid mootness | Legg claimed future sentencing enhancements, denial of favorable plea/probation offers, and ineligibility for a §76-3-402 reduction | State argued these consequences are speculative, discretionary, or not sufficiently likely; §402 ineligibility was not shown to be likely for Legg | Court: Legg failed to demonstrate actual adverse legal consequences; appeal is moot |
| Whether any recognized mootness exceptions (public interest or collateral consequences) apply | Legg relied on collateral-consequences exception; not public-interest | State invoked mootness and lack of collateral consequences | Court: Public-interest exception not invoked; collateral-consequences exception not met; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553 (Utah 2015) (sets Eldridge factors for when panels may overrule prior appellate precedent)
- Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981) (presumption of collateral consequences in criminal convictions and the burden-shifting framework)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (actuality requirement for collateral consequences and limits on mootness doctrines)
- Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (recognition that criminal convictions carry collateral legal consequences)
- State v. Warner, 347 P.3d 846 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (court of appeals panel earlier presumed collateral consequences in probation revocations; later overruled)
- State v. Allen, 353 P.3d 1266 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (same as Warner; presumed collateral consequences and later overruled)