State v. Lee, 396 P.3d 316

Background

In 2009 J.W. reported sexual activity with a man she called "Rick." Lee was arrested but released when no charges were filed; investigation stalled and Lee was re‑arrested and charged in 2013.
The State charged Lee with five counts of third‑degree rape of a child; at trial the jury convicted on two counts and acquitted on three; an alleged aggravator was not found.
Before trial Lee sought to cross‑examine J.W. about a June 2008 prior false police report in which she (and her mother) initially alleged a classmate raped her, then recanted the next day.
The trial court allowed questioning that J.W. had made a prior false accusation to police but barred specifying that the prior accusation was a rape accusation (citing rape‑shield concerns).
The Court of Appeals found evidentiary error but no Confrontation Clause violation and upheld the convictions as harmless; the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on confrontation and speedy‑trial grounds but remanded for an individualized ability‑to‑pay inquiry for legal financial obligations (LFOs).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lee)	Held
Limiting cross‑examination about prior false accusation — Confrontation Clause	Trial accommodation (asking whether a false report was made) sufficed; exclusion of the word "rape" protected victims and avoided prejudicial evidence	Exclusion of the fact that the prior report alleged rape infringed Lee's Sixth Amendment right to confront and impeach the witness; constitutional harmless error review required	Court held no Confrontation Clause violation: evidence had minimal probative value, was prejudicial, and the State's interests outweighed Lee's need; accommodation was adequate
Harmless‑error standard to apply	Nonconstitutional harmless error appropriate if no constitutional violation	Constitutional (Chapman) harmless error should apply if confrontation clause was violated	Because no confrontation violation, court declined to decide whether constitutional standard was required
Delay between 2009 arrest and 2013 charging — Speedy trial	No violation because Lee was released without charges and not restrained; speedy‑trial protections did not attach	Delay deprived Lee of Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial rights; review warranted even though raised on appeal	Court held no manifest constitutional error; speedy‑trial right did not attach absent restraint or pending charges; not reviewable for first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a)(3)
Imposition of LFOs without ability‑to‑pay inquiry	(implicit) LFOs imposed at sentencing	Trial court failed to perform individualized present/future ability‑to‑pay inquiry as required by Blazina	Court remanded for trial court to consider Lee's ability to pay LFOs consistent with Blazina

Key Cases Cited

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (Confrontation Clause protects opportunity for effective cross‑examination)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (trial courts have wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross‑examination)
State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1 (Wash. 1983) (articulating compelling state interest standard for excluding minimally relevant sexual‑history evidence)
State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612 (Wash. 2002) (three‑part test for confrontation challenges to limits on cross‑examination)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (framework for speedy‑trial claims)
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1982) (speedy‑trial protections do not apply where charges dismissed and defendant not restrained)