320 Conn. 500
Conn.2016Background
- Between Oct.–Dec. 2009 the defendant committed three armed robberies (Norwalk, Greenwich, Stamford); one victim in Norwalk died. The defendant was arrested shortly after the Stamford robbery, gave a written confession about Stamford, and was jailed.
- While jailed on the Stamford charge the defendant told a cooperating cellmate (Anthony Simmons) about his involvement in the Norwalk and Greenwich incidents; that information led to additional charges and eventual joinder of all three cases for trial.
- At trial the jury convicted the defendant on murder, felony murder, attempt to commit murder, multiple robbery counts; total effective sentence 90 years.
- Defendant argued (1) admission of his jailhouse statements to Simmons violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because he was represented on the Stamford case when he made them and the cases were later joined; and (2) the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause or abused its discretion by curtailing cross-examination of coconspirator/witness Teran Nelson about his cooperation agreement and prior inconsistent statements.
- The trial court admitted Simmons’ testimony and allowed extensive cross-examination of Nelson but sustained some objections to specific questions; the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional claims de novo and the abuse-of-discretion claim for scope of cross-examination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission of defendant’s jailhouse statements to a cooperating cellmate violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (because defendant was represented on Stamford charge when he made the statements and the cases were later joined) | State: Statements concerned separate offenses (Norwalk, Greenwich) for which Sixth Amendment attachment had not occurred; admissible and, if error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Leconte: Statements were obtained while he was represented on the Stamford matter and, after joinder, could improperly lead jurors to infer guilt on Stamford counts; constitutional error requiring reversal | Court: Sixth Amendment is offense-specific (Texas v. Cobb); admission was not reversible error — any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming Stamford evidence (Stamford confession, eyewitnesses, flight/apprehension) |
| Whether limiting certain cross-examination of coconspirator Nelson violated the Confrontation Clause or was an abuse of discretion | Leconte: Preclusion of five specific lines of questioning denied effective confrontation and prevented exposing motive/bias (agreement inducements, whether Nelson would "take the rap," who decides truthfulness, changes after agreement) | State: Nelson was extensively cross-examined about lies, inducements, and benefits; the excluded questions were cumulative, not relevant, or based on documents not in evidence; trial court acted within discretion | Court: No Confrontation Clause violation — defense was permitted to expose facts showing bias/interest and challenge credibility; exclusions were largely cumulative or irrelevant and fell within trial court’s broad discretion; no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel applied to the states)
- Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Confrontation Clause applied to the states)
- State v. Santos, 318 Conn. 412 (2015) (harmless error analysis for constitutional violations; totality of evidence review)
- State v. Brown, 273 Conn. 330 (2005) (scope of cross-examination and confrontation analysis; trial court discretion)
- State v. Artis, 314 Conn. 131 (2014) (confession as highly probative evidence)