843 S.E.2d 317
N.C. Ct. App.2020Background
- Juanita Nicole Lebeau was tried and on April 10, 2019 a jury found her guilty of trafficking 4–14 grams of methadone (two sale counts were consolidated into the trafficking count).
- At sentencing on April 10 the judge announced in open court a "mandatory 70 months," and the written judgment initially listed both minimum and maximum as 70 months.
- The Clerk queried the judge about inconsistencies; the judge replied that the trafficking conviction carried a 70 to 93 month term after consolidation.
- On April 15, 2019 the judge entered an amended judgment reflecting a minimum of 70 months and a maximum of 93 months (the statutorily prescribed range).
- Defendant timely appealed, arguing (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the judgment after notice of appeal and (2) the April 15 amendment violated her right to be present because it substantively changed the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Lebeau's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to amend the judgment after notice of appeal | Trial court retains jurisdiction until a notice of appeal is given AND the appellate filing period (14 days) expires; only five days elapsed so jurisdiction remained | Notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction upon filing | Trial court retained jurisdiction; amendment occurred within 14‑day window (no error) |
| Whether amending the written judgment in defendant's absence violated her right to be present | The written amendment merely corrected/reflects the statutorily required maximum (a non‑discretionary byproduct of the verdict), not a substantive change | Any substantive deviation in the written judgment from the sentence pronounced in defendant's presence violates the right to be present | Amendment was clerical/statutory clarification (not substantive); no right‑to‑be‑present violation |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Arrington, 215 N.C. App. 161 (2011) (statutorily required components of a sentence may be a non‑discretionary byproduct, not a substantive change)
- State v. Mims, 180 N.C. App. 403 (2006) (defendant has right to be present for entry of sentence; substantive changes in absence require resentencing)
- State v. Davis, 123 N.C. App. 240 (1996) (discussion of when trial court jurisdiction is divested by appeal)
- State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399 (1956) (court has inherent power to make records speak the truth)
- State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198 (2000) (distinguishing clerical errors from substantive judicial determinations)
- State v. Hanner, 188 N.C. App. 137 (2008) (example of substantive change where sentences were altered to run consecutively rather than concurrently)