State v. Leason
77 So. 3d 933
La.2011Background
- Relators Shaffer, Leason, and Dyer were juveniles when they committed aggravated rape and were sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor (Dyer without parole).
- Louisiana law included commutation and parole provisos: life prisoners were not eligible for parole absent commutation, and parole eligibility depended on commutation or other provisions.
- Graham v. Florida held that the Eighth Amendment forbids life without parole for non-homicide offenses by juveniles, requiring a meaningful opportunity for release.
- Relators argued Graham requires re-sentencing or immediate parole eligibility by striking or severing commutation provisos and applying Graham to Louisiana law.
- The district court and the court below declined to order immediate release or resentencing, instead directing parole-eligibility under the existing, severed statutes as an interim measure.
- The majority amended Dyer’s sentence to remove the explicit no-parole restriction and directed DOC to apply La.R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2) criteria for parole eligibility, but the dissent would remand for fixed-term resentencing to enable parole calculations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Graham require parole eligibility for juvenile non-homicide life sentences? | Shaffer/Leason: life without parole for juveniles violates Graham; commutation provisions cannot be used to preserve parole denial. | La. courts: Graham does not mandate immediate release or fixed-term resentencing; parole access must occur via parole board process. | Graham requires a meaningful opportunity for release; state cannot rely on ad hoc clemency to provide that opportunity. |
| Are the commutation provisos (A2 and B) enforceable against juveniles sentenced to life for non-homicide crimes? | Commutation provisos improperly bar parole and conflict with Graham's requirements. | Provisos are valid legal prerequisites to parole eligibility under Louisiana law. | Provisos cannot be enforced to deny Graham-based parole access for similarly situated juveniles. |
| What remedy should be ordered to satisfy Graham’s command? | Remand for resentencing to a fixed term of years to calculate parole eligibility. | Amendments to parole eligibility under statute suffice; no immediate resentencing required. | Remand for fixed-term resentencing would better align with Graham; the majority provides interim parole-access measures instead. |
| Does the governor’s clemency power satisfy Graham’s requirement for meaningful release opportunities? | Executive clemency is an ad hoc and insufficient mechanism for meaningful release opportunities. | Clemency is an acceptable pathway to release when appropriate. | Executive clemency alone is inadequate to satisfy Graham’s requirement for meaningful opportunity to obtain release. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bosworth v. Whitley, 627 So.2d 629 (La.1993) ([R.S.] 15:574.4(B) precludes parole, guiding interpretation of parole for life sentences)
- State v. Wilson, 362 So.2d 536 (La.1978) (parole with conditions vs. statutory preclusion)
- State v. Valentine, 364 So.2d 595 (La.1978) (resentence to next available responsive verdict for aggravated rape under Selman line)
- State v. Craig, 340 So.2d 191 (La.1976) (principles for resentencing when mandatory penalties invalidated)
- State v. Dyer, 420 So.2d 686 (La.1982) (life sentence without benefit of parole affirmed for juvenile offender)
- Angel v. State, 704 S.E.2d 386 (Va.2011) (comparing Graham response to parole access under statutory scheme)