State v. Lear, 316 Neb. 14

Melvin Lear was charged with a felony in Nebraska on May 17, 2022, and entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 11, 2022, Lear's counsel requested a continuance for additional discovery, which the court granted, moving the trial beyond the original six-month statutory speedy trial period.
Subsequent continuances were granted, including one on November 30, 2022, largely at the request of the State (to which Lear did not object).
Lear later moved for absolute discharge, arguing his statutory speedy trial rights were violated because the time for trial had expired, even accounting for excludable periods.
The district court denied the motion for discharge, finding that Lear's request for the continuance had waived his statutory speedy trial rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b).
Lear appealed, contending that a joint continuance should not count as a waiver unless it was made solely at the defendant's request.

Issue	Lear's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Does a requested continuance that is joined by the State waive the defendant’s speedy trial right under § 29-1207(4)(b)?	Continuance must be requested by defendant alone, not jointly.	A defendant's request, even if joined by the State, triggers waiver.	Statute does not require the request be solely by the defendant; waiver applies.
Should the trial have been dismissed for a speedy trial violation?	The waived time did not apply; discharge required.	Waiver provision applies, so no discharge is due.	No violation; statutory speedy trial was waived by Lear’s request.

State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (interpreted § 29-1207(4)(b) regarding speedy trial waiver by continuance request)
State v. Bridgeford, 298 Neb. 156 (application of speedy trial waivers in context of continuances)
State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (discusses statutory speedy trial calculation and waivers)
State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (guides speedy trial clock tolling and calculation principles)