State v. Lazinger, 565 S.W.3d 220

Lazinger was charged with two counts of aggravated stalking under Mo. Rev. Stat. §565.225 based on (1) a September 2, 2014 phone call to M.L.’s child S.L. and (2) appearing at S.L.’s lacrosse practice on April 22, 2015. Count I alleged M.L. as the target; Count II alleged S.L. as the target.
At trial Lazinger was convicted on both counts and sentenced to two consecutive seven-year terms. She stipulated she previously pleaded guilty to a 2014 stalking conviction involving M.L., an element for aggravated stalking under §565.225.3(5).
Lazinger moved for judgment of acquittal arguing insufficient evidence that her lacrosse-practice presence purposely harassed M.L. and therefore that the State failed to prove a “course of conduct.”
Lazinger also objected to testimony from M.L. and S.L. about their subjective fear from prior (2013) incidents (unannounced porch visit and mailbox/vehicle damage), arguing the statute requires an objective reasonable-person standard, making the victims’ subjective feelings irrelevant and prejudicial.
The jury heard Lazinger’s own testimony admitting the call, prior conduct, awareness of an order of protection, threats, and she acknowledged beliefs that the children were "brainwashed" by M.L. Evidence also showed she left the lacrosse practice with a large stick and prescription information.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated stalking (Count I)	State: two acts (Sept. call and April lacrosse visit) constituted a course of conduct directed at M.L.; evidence supports that Lazinger acted "purposely" to harass M.L.	Lazinger: lacrosse attendance was not directed at M.L. (he was not present) and did not show purposeful harassment; thus no course of conduct was established	Court affirmed conviction: reasonable juror could infer Lazinger acted purposely to harass M.L.; the call and lacrosse incident together constituted a course of conduct
Admissibility of victims’ testimony about subjective fear from prior uncharged 2013 incidents	State: prior fear testimony is relevant to whether a reasonable person would be frightened by later conduct and to show the defendant knew her actions would be perceived as frightening	Lazinger: victims’ subjective feelings are irrelevant under the objective reasonable-person standard and prejudicial, likely confusing the jury	Court affirmed admission: testimony was logically and legally relevant because prior reactions made later harassment objectively reasonable and showed defendant’s awareness, probative value outweighed prejudice

State v. Joyner, 458 S.W.3d 875 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (evidence admission reviewed for abuse of discretion; limits on prejudicial prior-conduct evidence)
State v. Graham, 553 S.W.3d 411 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (aggravated-stalking aggravators and intermediary-directed harassment can support intent)
State v. Curry, 357 S.W.3d 259 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (prior communications to third parties relevant to harassment through intermediaries)
State v. Sigmon, 517 S.W.3d 653 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review; view evidence favorably to the verdict)
State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. banc 2016) (appellate review principles for inferences and sufficiency of evidence)