State v. Laune, 464 P.3d 459

Defendant convicted of violating a stalking protective order; trial court had appointed counsel.
Defendant’s sister posted $1,500 cash as a security deposit under a signed security agreement that warned the funds could be used to pay the defendant’s financial obligations.
At sentencing the court ordered defendant to pay $330 in court‑appointed attorney fees, to be taken from that security deposit; the judge said the funds were "available."
Defendant appealed, arguing that under ORS 135.265(2) (as amended in 1979) a third‑party security deposit should not be treated as the defendant’s property for an ability‑to‑pay finding.
The state relied on ORS 135.265(2) and prior case law recognizing that courts may withhold security deposits to satisfy obligations; the trial court had made an ability‑to‑pay finding.
The Court of Appeals affirmed but declined to reach the statutory interpretation issue because defendant failed to preserve that argument at trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court erred in imposing court‑appointed attorney fees by relying on the security deposit to find ability to pay	The deposit is a permissible source; ORS 135.265(2) lets the court withhold security to satisfy obligations, so funds were "available"	Third‑party deposits are not the defendant’s property after the 1979 amendment to ORS 135.265(2) and therefore cannot support an ability‑to‑pay finding	Not reached on the merits: appeal failed for lack of preservation; judgment affirmed
Whether defendant preserved the statutory‑interpretation challenge on appeal	The state did not dispute preservation in the Court of Appeals (argued merits)	Defendant contends he preserved by objecting to imposition of fees absent an ability‑to‑pay finding	Court held defendant did not adequately preserve the statutory argument; trial objection focused only on lack of a finding, not on the source/meaning of ORS 135.265(2)

State v. Crider, 291 Or App 23 (court may not impose costs unless record shows defendant "is or may be able to pay")
Rosentreter v. Clackamas County, 127 Or 531 (1928) (historical presumption that third‑party bail funds belong to defendant)
State v. Thomas, 292 Or App 756 (2018) (upholding fee imposition when court relied on defendant’s deposited security funds)
State v. Wise, 40 Or App 303 (1979) (trial court may implicitly find third‑party deposit available to defendant)
State v. Nichols, 68 Or App 922 (1984) (a third‑party deposit does not automatically prove ability to pay)
Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72 (1997) (courts must identify correct statutory interpretation when parties put it in issue)
State v. Shepherd, 236 Or App 157 (2010) (preservation requirement when statutory meaning is at stake)