434 P.3d 850
Kan.2019Background
- In 2000 LaPointe was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault based mainly on accomplice Michael Norton’s testimony and an eyewitness identification; no forensic evidence linked LaPointe to the crime at trial.
- Hairs were found on clothing recovered near the scene; at trial a hair-expert testified the hairs probably did not belong to LaPointe but that this did not preclude he had worn the garments.
- In 2014 LaPointe moved for postconviction DNA testing under K.S.A. 21-2512; the district court ordered testing despite the State's objections about statutory eligibility.
- DNA testing produced two usable hair results: one conclusively excluded LaPointe; the other was inconclusive but more likely excluded him.
- The district court denied a new trial, finding no reasonable probability the DNA results would have produced a different verdict; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The Supreme Court: (1) affirmed denial of a new trial; (2) held a Kansas detainer made LaPointe "in state custody" for the statute; and (3) rejected extending statutory eligibility beyond convictions for first-degree murder and rape, overruling Cheeks I to that extent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether favorable postconviction DNA requires a new trial | LaPointe: excluded hairs materially undermine accomplice and eyewitness testimony and create reasonable probability of different outcome | State: jury already knew hairs likely not LaPointe; strongest evidence was accomplice and eyewitness testimony, so DNA would not change result | Denied—court did not abuse discretion; DNA was favorable but not of such materiality to create reasonable probability of different verdict |
| Whether LaPointe was "in state custody" when in federal prison with a Kansas detainer | LaPointe: detainer and pending Kansas sentence meant he was in state custody when he filed | State: physical custody by federal authorities means not "in state custody" | Held: detainer and attendant restraints suffice; LaPointe was in state custody for the statute |
| Whether K.S.A. 21-2512 applies to convictions other than 1st‑degree murder or rape (Equal Protection) | LaPointe: sentence severity (long term) makes him similarly situated to those covered by statute per Cheeks I | State: Legislature may limit statute by crime; crimes here (robbery/assault) are not equivalent to murder or rape | Held: statute limited to convictions specified (murder/rape); overrules Cheeks I to extent it used sentence length as the determinative comparator; LaPointe not similarly situated |
| Whether the State may appeal via question reserved after final judgment | State: sought review of statutory eligibility questions reserved under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3) | LaPointe: (implicit) prior interlocutory attempt was premature; now case is final | Held: Questions reserved present statewide issues of uniform administration; review appropriate on final judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cheeks, 298 Kan. 1 (Kan. 2013) (majority previously extended postconviction DNA testing based on sentence severity—overruled in part)
- Haddock v. State, 295 Kan. 738 (Kan. 2012) (standard for assessing impact of postconviction DNA testing; reasonable-probability/new-trial framework)
- Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475 (Kan. 2006) (categorization of DNA test results and procedural consequences)
- State v. Rodriguez, 302 Kan. 85 (Kan. 2015) (postconviction DNA excluding third‑party DNA did not compel new trial where jury heard explanations and identification remained central)
- State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643 (Kan. 2004) (elements-based similarly situated analysis comparing crimes for DNA-test eligibility)
- State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245 (Kan. 2009) (rejected broader equivalence where crime elements differ)
