State v. Landfair, 70 So. 3d 1061

Background

Landfair was convicted of first degree robbery (La. R.S. 14:64.1) and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.
A 4th-offender (habitual offender) proceeding was filed; the court later adjudicated life imprisonment without parole, following the State’s proof of prior predicates.
The underlying offense occurred November 24, 2007, at the Empress Hotel; the victim observed the defendant at the hotel and recognized him as Karma Landfair.
Police matched the defendant’s silver tennis shoes to those worn by the robber; a videotaped confession and a search located the money, gun, and clothing used in the crime.
The defendant testified he was assaulted by officers and claimed the confession was coerced; detectives denied any misconduct.
Prior convictions for cocaine-related offenses (possession with intent to distribute) were introduced as predicate convictions for the habitual offender proceeding.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether grand jury indictment was required for the fourth-offender enhancement	Landfair contends due process required grand jury indictment.	Landfair argued the enhancement statute must be charged by indictment.	No grand jury indictment required; enhancement is not a crime and does not require indictment.
Whether Landfair had a right to jury trial on the multiple-offender proceeding	Landfair asserts Apprendi/Shepard require jury findings for identity of prior convictions.	Landfair argues a jury should decide the habitual-offender determination.	No right to jury trial on a multiple-offender determination; issue not preserved for review.
Sufficiency of proof of predicate convictions and defendant identity	State must prove identity and validity of prior pleas beyond reasonable doubt.	State failed to prove the predicates or their convictions were valid.	Record supports identity and validity; lack of preservation bars appellate review on these points.
Whether sequencing of prior convictions was required for 15:529.1	Johnson sequencing rule should apply to require a specific order of offenses.	Pre-Johnson convictions should be counted without strict sequencing under amended law.	Johnson's sequencing rule is superseded by statute; the pre- and post-2004 amendments do not compel a strict sequence here.
Whether the life sentence under 15:529.1 is constitutionally excessive	Dorthey-based scrutiny should apply to evaluate excessiveness.	Life sentence is mandatory for a fourth-offender with crimes of violence; no downward departure warranted.	No merit; the sentence complies with Dorthey standards and the statute's mandatory minimum for the offender.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Vincent, 56 So.3d 408 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2011) (grand jury indictment not required for habitual-offender enhancement)
State v. Johnson, 884 So.2d 568 (La. 2004) (Johnson holds sequencing for 15:529.1 is legislative; not a strict offense-conviction-offense order)
State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La. 1992) (early sequencing interpretation of 15:529.1 rejected by Johnson)
State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993) (guides excessive-sentence review for habitual-offender cases)
State v. Randall, 51 So.3d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2010) (preservation requirements in multiple bills and sequencing discussed)
State v. Cossee, 678 So.2d 72 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996) (burden-shifting and objections in multiple-bill proceedings)