State v. Lampl
296 Ga. 892
Ga.2015Background
- In March 2011 a Clayton County judge, at the district attorney’s request, impaneled a special purpose grand jury authorized to investigate public corruption by county officials and employees.
- John James Lampl, City Manager for the City of Morrow (a city employee, not a county official), was subpoenaed and testified before that special purpose grand jury in June 2011 about the city project “Olde Towne Morrow.”
- The special purpose grand jury returned a 16-count indictment (including a perjury count based on Lampl’s grand-jury testimony); that indictment was later nolle prossed after Kenerly v. State held special purpose grand juries may investigate but lack authority to indict.
- A regular Clayton County grand jury later returned an eight-count indictment against Lampl, including a perjury count based on his prior special-purpose-grand-jury testimony; Lampl moved to quash/dismiss/suppress, arguing the special purpose grand jury exceeded its impaneling order.
- The superior court and Court of Appeals held the special purpose grand jury exceeded its scope, quashed the perjury count, and suppressed Lampl’s testimony; the Georgia Supreme Court agreed the grand jury exceeded authority but reversed the suppression/dismissal as improper relief.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Lampl's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the special purpose grand jury exceeded its impaneling scope | Investigation was authorized as issued; its subpoenas were lawful | Impaneling order limited investigation to county officials/employees; Lampl (a city employee) was outside scope | Court: Special purpose grand jury exceeded its authority in investigating Olde Towne Morrow and subpoenaing Lampl |
| Whether Lampl’s subpoena/testimony violated Fifth Amendment or state self-incrimination protections | Subpoenaing a target witness does not per se violate the Fifth Amendment; witness may invoke privilege when incriminating answers arise | Subpoenaing a target (and compelling appearance) violated privilege and due process | Court: No Fifth Amendment or statutory violation shown; Lampl was not charged when subpoenaed and did not invoke the privilege |
| Whether evidence derived from the overbroad special purpose grand jury must be suppressed | Suppression/dismissal are extreme remedies reserved for constitutional violations or structural defects | Overreach by prosecutor/grand jury was misconduct warranting suppression/dismissal | Court: Overreach alone (statutory violation) did not rise to constitutional or structural unfairness necessary to suppress or dismiss |
| Whether dismissal of the perjury count was required as remedy | Dismissal suppressed as remedy; regular grand jury properly returned present indictment | Perjury count derives from unlawfully convened grand jury; must be dismissed and testimony suppressed | Court: Dismissal/suppression were improper; case remanded (perjury count’s substantive viability left open to trial court) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kenerly v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190 (Ga. Ct. App.) (special purpose grand juries limited to investigation and lack power to indict)
- Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 456 (Ga.) (grand jury may consider evidence without regard to trial admissibility)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (U.S.) (grand jury functioning is generally unrestrained by trial evidentiary rules)
- United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (U.S.) (Fifth Amendment does not bar subpoenaing a target witness to appear before a grand jury)
- Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745 (Ga.) (dismissal of indictment is extreme and generally disfavored)
- Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (U.S.) (structural defects in grand jury process can justify suppression/dismissal)