State v. Lamone
115451
| Kan. Ct. App. | Jun 9, 2017Background
- On Feb. 12, 2014, Stephanie Lamone was arrested after a single-car crash and recorded a .214 BAC; charged under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 8-1567 for DUI.
- The complaint alleged two prior Wichita Municipal Court DUI convictions (one diversion in 2010, one guilty finding in 2011) under Wichita City Ordinance 11.38.150; those priors were used to charge felony DUI under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(D).
- Lamone repeatedly contested using the municipal convictions as state priors, arguing the Wichita ordinance was broader than the state statute because its definition of “vehicle” included bicycles.
- The trial court examined the municipal charging documents, found the prior DUIs involved a Toyota (motor vehicle), admitted the priors, and Lamone was convicted and sentenced as a felony.
- On appeal the court considered whether the municipal ordinance is divisible (per the modified categorical approach) and whether consulting charging documents to determine the type of “vehicle” violated Apprendi/Descamps/Mathis principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lamone) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prior Wichita municipal DUI convictions may count as state priors under K.S.A. 8-1567(i) when the municipal ordinance defined “vehicle” more broadly than the state statute | Wichita ordinance was broader (included bicycles); thus municipal convictions cannot be counted as state priors | Ordinance prohibits the same acts as state law; prior convictions may be used if charging documents show motor-vehicle conduct | Trial court erred: prior municipal convictions may not be used because the court improperly applied the modified categorical approach and the ordinance is not divisible |
| Whether the trial court could use the modified categorical approach to consult charging documents to determine what type of “vehicle” defendant operated in prior municipal convictions | Use of charging documents constituted impermissible judicial factfinding under Apprendi/Descamps/Mathis because the ordinance’s broader definition was a factual means, not an alternative element | Charging documents legitimately showed those priors involved motor vehicles, so priors should count | Modified categorical approach was not appropriate; consulting charging documents here was error |
| Whether the Wichita ordinance is a divisible statute (allowing modified categorical approach) | The ordinance merely listed factual ways to satisfy the single element “operate any vehicle” (not alternative elements); thus not divisible | If interpreted as divisible, a court may examine prior charging papers to identify motor-vehicle convictions | Court held the ordinance is not divisible (Mathis/Brown analysis): the definition of “vehicle” lists means, not separate elements |
| Whether Lamone invited any error by contesting priors but not the factual content of the prior charging documents | Lamone continually challenged legal effect of priors and did not stipulate to their legal effect; she preserved the issue | State argued Lamone invited the court to consider prior facts by litigating the priors and stipulated to facts at bench trial | Court rejected invited-error argument; Lamone preserved the right to challenge using municipal priors |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact other than prior conviction that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by jury beyond reasonable doubt)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts increasing mandatory minimum receive same constitutional protection as Apprendi)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (distinguishes categorical and modified categorical approaches for prior-offense sentencing enhancements)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (statutory language that lists alternative means rather than separate elements is not divisible for modified categorical analysis)
- State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 (2015) (adopts Descamps framework and explains categorical vs. modified categorical approaches in Kansas)
- City of Wichita v. Hackett, 275 Kan. 848 (2003) (Wichita ordinance’s broader vehicle definition means bicycle DUIs under city code do not qualify as state DUIs for sentencing)
Disposition: Sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing without using or considering the two Wichita municipal DUI convictions for state-sentencing enhancement under K.S.A. 8-1567.