State v. Lackey
286 P.3d 859
| Kan. | 2012Background
- Lackey convicted in 2002 of premeditated murder and rape for 1982 crimes.
- Lackey filed a May 16, 2007 petition for forensic DNA testing under K.S.A. 21-2512.
- District court summarily denied the petition on May 30, 2007.
- Lackey alleged failure to notify the prosecuting attorney and misapplication of testing criteria.
- Court of Appeals and then this court addressed proper statutory procedure and need for counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
- Hair evidence testing was pivotal to whether testing may yield noncumulative, exculpatory evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court complied with 21-2512 notification requirements. | Lackey: failed to notify prosecutor as required. | State: notification not essential to resolution. | Notification error not raised relief but error acknowledged. |
| Whether the testing requests fit 21-2512(a)(1)-(3) and merit testing. | Lackey: material qualifies for testing under (a)(1)-(3). | State: most requests do not meet criteria. | Hair testing qualifies under (a)(3); others generally not, but must be heard at evidentiary hearing. |
| Whether Lackey is entitled to counsel and an evidentiary hearing. | Lackey: Bruner requires counsel and hearing. | State: no automatic hearing. | Remanded for appointment of counsel and evidentiary hearing. |
| Whether exculpatory potential can be found independent of weighing all evidence. | Exculpatory means tends to negate guilt, not absolute exoneration. | Exculpatory limited by trial theory and evidence. | Exculpatory potential not limited to non-overwhelming evidence; requires hearing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603 (2004) (permits appointment of counsel and evidentiary hearing for DNA testing requests)
- Wimbley v. State, 292 Kan. 796 (2011) (defines testing criteria and procedure under 21-2512(a))
- Haddock v. State, 295 Kan. 738 (2012) (recognizes exculpatory evidence may be non-exonerating; informs weighting of new evidence)
- State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346 (1997) (defines exculpatory evidence in context of disclosure)
- State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan. 149 (1986) (original definition of exculpatory evidence)
- State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41 (2010) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)