State v. Lacaze, 208 So. 3d 856

Background

In 1995 LaCaze and co-defendant Antoinette Frank were convicted of three counts of first-degree murder (restaurant employees Cuong and Ha Vu and Officer Ronnie Williams); LaCaze received death sentence affirmed on direct appeal.
State evidence: survivors identified both defendants; surveillance of LaCaze and Frank together earlier that night buying 9mm ammo; LaCaze made custodial statements placing himself in the restaurant; inconsistent alibi testimony at trial.
LaCaze pursued post-conviction relief; after an evidentiary hearing the federal district court vacated convictions and death sentence, concluding a juror (David Settle) failed to disclose law‑enforcement experience—constituting structural error and requiring new trial.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit granted the State’s writ and reinstated convictions and sentence, finding the district court erred in treating Settle’s seating as structural error and rejecting other claims.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed whether (1) non‑disclosure and possible bias of jurors warranted relief, (2) counsel was ineffective during voir dire and trial, (3) judge should have recused, (4) Brady/Giglio suppression or subornation of perjury occurred, and (5) newly proffered evidence established actual innocence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (LaCaze)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Juror non‑disclosure (David Settle)	Settle failed to disclose law‑enforcement background; would have been challengeable for cause; seating was structural error entitling to new trial	No per se bar on law‑enforcement jurors; Settle was non‑custodial/desk BMV employee without arrest power; no actual bias shown	No reversible error; McDonough standard not met — no proof Settle was biased or would have been subject to meritorious challenge
Ineffective assistance during voir dire	Trial counsel failed to expose juror biases and challenge unfit jurors	Voir dire strategy is tactical; absent showing a seated juror was challengeable, Strickland not satisfied	Denied — counsel’s performance not shown to be prejudicial under Strickland
Judge recusal (Judge Marullo)	Judge had connection to release of a 9mm from evidence to Frank; nondisclosure created appearance of impropriety requiring recusal	No evidence of bias; any administrative signature irrelevant to issues tried; presumption of impartiality stands	Denied — no proof of bias or interest sufficient to overcome presumption of impartiality
Brady/Giglio (failure to disclose/expose witnesses)	State withheld evidence about Frank obtaining a 9mm, Adam Frank as a person of interest, and inconsistent prior statements by survivor Chau Vu; prosecutor failed to correct misleading testimony	Evidence about weapon release and Adam did not exculpate LaCaze; Chau’s prior statement consistent with trial ID; any purported misleading testimony not likely to affect verdict	Denied — withheld material not shown to be exculpatory or material to outcome; Giglio/Napue prejudice standard not met
Trial counsel general ineffectiveness	Counsel unprepared in first capital trial; omitted many witnesses and motions (alibi witnesses, suppression motions)	Many omissions were reasonable strategic choices; proposed witnesses inconsistent or weak; suppression claims speculative	Denied — claims lacked specific showing of prejudice under Strickland
Actual innocence (post‑conviction new evidence)	New informant/inmate testimony and later evidence tying Adam to a similar gun establish innocence or undermine confidence in verdict	New evidence is weak, inconsistent, and non‑conclusive; substantial trial evidence supports conviction	Denied — new evidence not material, noncumulative, or conclusive to meet the high actual‑innocence standard

Key Cases Cited

State v. LaCaze, 824 So.2d 1063 (La. 2002) (direct‑appeal opinion affirming convictions and sentence)
State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317 (La. 1980) (discussing competence of badge‑wearing law‑enforcement jurors)
State v. Ballard, 747 So.2d 1077 (La. 1999) (overruling Simmons per se ban; judge may assess officer juror's impartiality)
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part test for juror non‑disclosure: dishonest answer to material question + meritorious challenge for cause)
Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring proof of actual bias or specific facts from which bias must be presumed)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (U.S. 2000) (juror concealment and remand for evidentiary hearing where relationships concealed)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (ineffective‑assistance two‑prong standard)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (U.S. 1972) (prosecution duty to correct false testimony; materiality standard)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (U.S. 1959) (due process violated when state uses false evidence)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (Brady materiality test — verdict worthy of confidence)
State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988) (deference to fact‑finder credibility determinations)
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (U.S. 2013) (standard for actual‑innocence gateway in federal habeas)