State v. L. Gudmundsen, 517 P.3d 146

Gudmundsen pleaded guilty in 2019 to one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and received a five-year DOC sentence, all suspended, with standard probation conditions (abstain from drugs/alcohol, drug testing, treatment, permission for major purchases, report to PO).
She had multiple positive methamphetamine tests through Jan 2020 and purchased a vehicle without permission in March 2020; later she missed reporting in Aug 2020 and was arrested on a new drug-possession charge on Oct 23, 2020.
She entered treatment and Treatment Court in Nov 2020 and continued until sentencing May 3, 2021; no probation violations were recorded during two periods she claimed as elapsed time (Apr–Jul 2020 and Nov 2020–Apr 2021).
The State moved to revoke her suspended sentence; under a plea agreement Gudmundsen admitted the violation and pled guilty to the new charge; the State recommended consecutive suspended sentences of 3 years (revocation) and 5 years (new charge).
At sentencing Gudmundsen requested 10 months’ credit as elapsed time under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA; the District Court denied the request in oral ruling and in written order, citing “repeated violations” but did not identify specific violations during the claimed periods.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the court erred by denying elapsed-time credit without stating specific probation violations for the periods claimed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court violated § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, by denying credit for elapsed time served on probation without basing denial on specific violations	The court had discretion; the plea reduction to 3 years effectively accounted for any elapsed-time credit and thus denial was proper	Statute mandates credit for all elapsed time served absent a record/recollection of violations; denial without specific violations is illegal	Reversed: statute requires credit unless specific probation violations during the claimed periods are shown; generalized “pattern” reasoning insufficient

State v. Jardee, 399 Mont. 459 (Mont. 2020) (interpreting revised § 46-18-203(7)(b) to require credit for elapsed time absent specific violations)
State v. Tippets, 408 Mont. 249 (Mont. 2022) (credit-for-time-served calculation is a legal mandate reviewed de novo)
State v. Parks, 397 Mont. 408 (Mont. 2019) (calculating credit for time served is not discretionary)
State v. Graves, 381 Mont. 37 (Mont. 2015) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Triplett, 346 Mont. 383 (Mont. 2008) (statutory interpretation principles)