State v. Kyree Rice
159 A.3d 1250
N.H.2017Background
- At ~1:45 a.m., a melee broke out in a crowded Manchester restaurant; Curtis Clay (intoxicated) punched Raheem Rice and others. Kyree Rice (defendant) entered, displayed a gun, and later fired two shots that hit Clay. Defendant claimed defense-of-another (Raheem).
- Clay tested positive for alcohol, cocaine, and cannabis at the hospital; defense sought to cross-examine him about drug use for impeachment and to show increased aggression; the trial court excluded that evidence as irrelevant without an expert link to impairment.
- Prosecutor argued that the defendant introduced deadly force when he produced/pointed the gun (prior to shooting), portraying the display as the moment deadly force was injected into the encounter.
- Defense requested a jury instruction quoting RSA 627:9, IV: "The act of producing or displaying a weapon shall constitute non-deadly force." The trial court refused, reasoning the statute didn’t apply where display was “an integral part” of the crime.
- Jury convicted the defendant of attempted murder and two counts of first-degree assault; the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed and remanded, holding the court erred by omitting the requested instruction; it affirmed exclusion of drug-use questioning as to substantive aggressiveness absent causal proof, and reserved the perception/impeachment common-knowledge question for retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Rice) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by refusing instruction that producing/displaying a weapon is non-deadly force (RSA 627:9, IV). | No; instruction unnecessary because display was an integral part of the crime and court had adequately instructed on deadly force. | Yes; prosecutor’s closing shifted focus to the moment of drawing the gun, so jury needed statutory instruction that producing/displaying a weapon is non-deadly force. | Reversed: trial court abused discretion by failing to give the requested instruction; omission likely prejudiced jury. |
| Whether exclusion of cross-examining victim about cocaine use to show increased aggression was improper. | Evidence insufficiently connected to impairment/aggression; thus irrelevant. | Cocaine use increases aggression and bears on reasonableness of defendant’s belief; should be admissible. | Affirmed exclusion: defendant failed to proffer expert proof linking detected cocaine to impairment/aggression, so relevance not established. |
| Whether exclusion of cross-examining victim about cocaine/marijuana to impeach perception/memory was improper. | Same relevance concerns; no proper foundation. | Such effects are within common knowledge and relevant to credibility/perception. | Not decided on merits; court declined to resolve common-knowledge question now and left it open for retrial. |
| Whether omission of non-deadly-force instruction could be cured by other jury instructions (e.g., deadly-force definition). | "Good enough": reading deadly-force statute sufficed. | No; specific statutory non-deadly-force instruction was necessary given prosecutor's argument and absence of any non-deadly-force guidance. | Rejected State’s "good enough" argument; omission was prejudicial. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gingras, 162 N.H. 633 (2011) (failure to give full deadly-force/non-deadly-force instructions prejudicial where jury could misclassify gun display as deadly force)
- State v. Noucas, 165 N.H. 146 (2013) (defense instruction limits when force used is element of charged crime; narrowly tailored instructions may be required)
- State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57 (2011) (self-defense/defense-of-others principles; burden on State to disprove defense once raised)
- State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104 (1988) (trial court must instruct jury on legal significance of facts supported by evidence)