State v. Kurtz
178 Wash. 2d 466
| Wash. | 2013Background
- In 2010 police executed a search warrant at William Kurtz’s home and found marijuana and plants; Kurtz was charged with possession and manufacturing of marijuana.
- At trial Kurtz sought to present evidence to support a common-law medical necessity defense and a statutory medical-marijuana defense under the Medical Use of Marijuana Act (the Act); the State moved to exclude both.
- The trial court barred both defenses; a jury convicted Kurtz; the Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the defenses but remanded on an offender-score issue.
- Kurtz petitioned the Washington Supreme Court, arguing the common-law medical necessity defense remains available after the Act and was improperly excluded.
- The Supreme Court considered whether prior cases (Diana, Williams, Seeley) or the Act abrogated or superseded the common-law medical necessity defense for marijuana.
- The Court held the common-law medical necessity defense remains available and remanded for the trial court to assess whether Kurtz presented sufficient evidence of necessity (including whether compliance with the Act was a viable legal alternative).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kurtz) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether common-law medical necessity for marijuana remains available | Diana-based common-law defense persists and was not implicitly abolished by Seeley or scheduling | Seeley and marijuana’s Schedule I classification eliminate common-law necessity; Act replaces common law | Court: common-law medical necessity remains available; Seeley/scheduling do not implicitly abolish it |
| Whether the Medical Use of Marijuana Act abrogates or supersedes the common law defense | Act does not clearly express intent to abrogate common law; statutory provisions can coexist with common-law elements | Act’s affirmative defense/structure was intended to replace the common-law defense and is inconsistent with it | Court: Act does not abrogate common-law necessity; no clear legislative intent to deviate and not irreconcilably inconsistent |
| Whether the existence of the Act precludes assertion of necessity as a matter of law | Existence of statutory pathway is a factor but does not automatically preclude a necessity defense; whether a legal alternative existed is a factual inquiry | Because the Act provides a legal alternative, necessity is unavailable where statutory compliance was possible | Court: statutory alternative is relevant to whether a reasonable legal alternative existed, but it is a factual issue for the trial court |
| Whether Kurtz was entitled to present necessity at trial given his record evidence | Kurtz had medical authorizations and evidence relevant to necessity; trial court wrongly barred the defense without assessing sufficiency | Trial court properly excluded defenses because Kurtz failed to comply with Act timing and authority | Court: trial court erred to foreclose common-law necessity without evaluating whether evidence supported it; remand for factual inquiry and potential new trial if defense supported |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Diana, 24 Wn. App. 908 (1979) (first articulation of a limited common-law medical-necessity defense for marijuana and a three-part test)
- State v. Williams, 93 Wn. App. 340 (1998) (Court of Appeals held scheduling and Seeley precluded common-law necessity for marijuana)
- Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776 (1997) (addressed validity of marijuana’s classification under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act; did not resolve common-law necessity)
- United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (Supreme Court discussion that legal alternatives defeat necessity/duress defenses)
- Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar Electric Co., 112 Wn.2d 847 (1989) (example where statute was held to preempt and replace common-law causes of action)