State v. Krancki, 851 N.W.2d 824

Krancki appeals his OWI conviction, claiming trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance due to a series of errors and broken promises.
The offense was an alleged seventh OWI; the trial issue was whether the State could prove driving occurred at the time of intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before trial, Krancki pressed that someone named Jason drove him home and that he wanted to testify about Jason; counsel promised in opening that Krancki would testify.
Krancki never testified; defense focused on officer’s limited view and not seeing through tinted windows to identify the driver or whether another person was in the vehicle.
A Machner hearing followed; postconviction counsel argued three ineffectiveness theories; the circuit court denied relief after finding no prejudice even if performance was deficient.
The court ultimately affirmed the conviction, addressing each asserted error and rejecting prejudice and cumulative prejudice arguments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Broken promise to have Krancki testify	Krancki asserts failing to call him and not explaining breached counsel’s promise.	Counsel followed client’s decision to testify or not; the promise was invited by the client.	Not prejudicial; promise was invitational and defense remained coherent.
References to pretrial silence about another driver	Pretrial silence references violated Fifth Amendment rights.	References were permissible under noncustodial questioning; Salinas applicable but ultimately inapplicable.	Harmless error; no reasonable probability of different outcome.
Failure to obtain BAC stipulation on over-limit evidence	Counsel should have secured a stipulation that BAC was over the limit to avoid prejudice.	BAC evidence (0.26) was probative to element and not unfairly prejudicial.	Not deficient; BAC evidence properly admitted to prove an element.
Cumulative error claim	Cumulative errors prejudiced the defense.	Errors, even if present, do not collectively undermine the verdict given the defense theory.	No reversible prejudice; cumulative errors did not alter result.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121 (Wis. 1990) (policy for reviewing trial-counsel effectiveness in Wisconsin)
State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122 (Wis. 1980) (client-directed decision on whether to testify governs trial strategy)
State v. Divanovic, 200 Wis. 2d 210 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (counsel must follow client’s undelegated decisions; no ineffective assistance claim where client dictates action)
State v. Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642 (Wis. 2007) (harmless-error/plain-error framework for unobjected silence references)
State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224 (Wis. 1982) (harmless-error analysis for pre- and post-Miranda silence references)
State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628 (Wis. 1997) (limits on admissibility of prior-OWI convictions and prejudice considerations)
State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226 (Wis. 1988) (post-M miranda rights considerations for silence in certain contexts)
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (S. Ct. 2013) (Fifth Amendment silence in noncustodial interview context; plurality holding discussed)