Background - Defendant Lukas Kostelecky pleaded guilty to criminal mischief (reduced to a class A misdemeanor) for damaging a ten‑year‑old copy machine at New Town High School. - At a restitution hearing the school presented a $3,790 replacement quote and evidence the damaged machine had a depreciated value of $400. - Kostelecky presented evidence that refurbished replacement options cost between $1,111 and $1,795 and argued restitution should not force the victim to buy a newer/more expensive item. - The district court ordered restitution of $3,790, stating Marsy’s Law (N.D. Const. art. I, § 25(1)(n)) required full restitution and that it could not determine whether the school would be "beyond whole." - Kostelecky appealed, arguing the district court misapplied the law and abused its discretion by ordering restitution without weighing the evidence of actual/reasonable damages. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---| | Does N.D. Const. art. I, § 25(1)(n) (Marsy’s Law) require restitution equal to the victim’s actual expenditures without regard to whether that exceeds making the victim whole? | Marsy’s Law requires "full" restitution and thus the school is entitled to the $3,790 it expended to replace the copier. | Marsy’s Law does not entitle the victim to replacement beyond the amount necessary to make the victim whole; court should consider reasonable/actual damages. | Court held Marsy’s Law does not change statutory restitution standards; it does not require restitution beyond what is necessary to make the victim whole. | | Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering $3,790 without evaluating competing evidence of lower replacement costs or considering statutory factors? | The State relied on the school’s replacement expenditure as actual damages. | Kostelecky presented evidence of lower refurbished replacement costs and argued court should weigh that evidence. | Court held the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the evidence and statutory factors when determining restitution. | | When is replacement cost an appropriate measure of restitution versus diminution in value/repair/secondary market value? | Replacement cost may be appropriate when necessary to make the victim whole. | Defendant argued replacement cost may be excessive when repairs or lower‑cost alternatives exist. | Court reaffirmed Tupa: replacement cost can be appropriate in some circumstances, but courts must assess reasonableness and alternatives. | | Must the appellate court decide whether Marsy’s Law limits consideration of defendant’s ability to pay and rehabilitative purpose (subsections b and c of N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑32‑08(1))? | State did not press this issue. | Defendant did not press this issue on appeal. | Court declined to decide; left that question unresolved. | ### Key Cases Cited State v. Tupa, 691 N.W.2d 579 (N.D. 2005) (replacement costs may be appropriate but may be excessive if repair or secondary market suffices) State v. Bingaman, 655 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 2002) (standard of review for restitution orders is similar to abuse of discretion) State v. Gates, 865 N.W.2d 816 (N.D. 2015) (finder of fact determines quantity of damages when amounts are hard to prove) State Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. City of Sherwood, 489 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1992) (apply statutory construction principles when construing constitutional provisions)