State v. Klein, 243 Or. App. 1

Klein was convicted of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated murder; appeal challenged body-wire/wiretap evidence, accomplice Hutchens' testimony corroboration, and exclusion of an out-of-court statement attributed to Hutchens.
Interceptions were authorized under ORS 133.726 and 133.724, arising from Hutchens' cooperation to obtain release from jail; a fourth order expanded interception to include Klein and others.
The State's case largely depended on evidence from the interceptions and Hutchens' testimony, detailing a gang-related murder plot following prior conflicts between the Rollin 60s and the Hoovers.
Hutchens admitted lying on initial police interviews but testified at trial about the crimes and her motivation for cooperating, which formed the core of the State's proof.
The trial court admitted the intercepted communications against Klein, and Klein challenged the second order as applying to him; the court denied suppression and the jury trial proceeded.
The court held that Hutchens' testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence, and that the excluded Banks impeachment testimony, though potentially admissible, was not prejudicial given cumulative evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Klein an 'aggrieved person' to challenge the second order?	Klein asserts he is aggrieved as an interception target.	Klein argues he was a person against whom the interception was directed.	No; Klein was not an aggrieved person for the second order.
Was the State's case properly corroborated beyond Hutchens' testimony?	Hutchens' testimony alone suffices due to accomplice rules.	Accomplice testimony cannot be corroborated by other accomplice statements or self-serving statements.	Yes; Hutchens' testimony was adequately corroborated by independent evidence and other non-testimonial corroboration.
Was the exclusion of Banks' testimony regarding Hutchens' jail remark prejudicial impeachment evidence?	Banks' testimony would impeach Hutchens on a key point that she claimed to have made up.	Banks' testimony would be admissible impeachment; the trial court erred in excluding it.	No reversible error; exclusion was not prejudicial given the admitted, cumulative nature of the evidence.
Were out-of-court statements by other participants admissible to corroborate Hutchens' testimony?	Statements by Hale/defendant could corroborate Hutchens' trial testimony.	Such statements cannot corroborate an accomplice's testimony under the cited framework.	Yes; non-testimonial statements by other participants can corroborate an accomplice's testimony, and there was sufficient corroboration here.

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (aggrieved status aligns with Fourth Amendment standing; limits to parties to intercepted conversations)
United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (accused may seek suppression only if interception implicated him or occurred on his premises)
United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant may move to suppress when the conversation did not occur on his premises or involve him)
U.S. v. Gibson, 500 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1974) (one-page discussion; aggrieved status tied to involvement in intercepted communications)
State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223 (1991) (corroboration may be circumstantial; need not cover every element)
State v. Norton, 157 Or. App. 606 (1998) (impeachment and corroboration principles for accomplice testimony)
State v. Boone, 213 Or. App. 242 (2007) (out-of-court statements by participants may corroborate accomplice testimony)
State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19 (2003) (harmless-error analysis for evidentiary exclusion; cumulative evidence consideration)
State v. Manzella, 306 Or. 303 (1988) (definition and scope of a 'confession' under evidentiary rules)