STATE v. KISTLER
2017 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 23
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant in Payne County charged with: Count 1 - Robbery with a Firearm; Count 2 - Burglary in the First Degree (alleged entry into a dwelling and then using a firearm to rob the occupant).
- Defendant moved to dismiss Count 2 under 21 O.S. § 11(A) and Lawson v. State (1971), arguing the counts constituted the same criminal act and one must be dismissed.
- Trial judge (Judge Kistler) ordered the State to dismiss one of the two counts and elect which to proceed on at trial, relying on Lawson and § 11.
- The State petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the trial court’s dismissal order.
- The Court granted the writ, holding the trial court’s order was unauthorized by law, clarified the correct § 11 analysis, and expressly overruled Lawson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 11 bars punishing Robbery with a Firearm and First‑Degree Burglary arising from the same incident | § 11 does not bar separate prosecutions because burglary (entry) and armed robbery (use of firearm) are separate acts with distinct elements | Counts merge as the same criminal act or omission under Lawson; § 11 prohibits multiple punishments for the same act | State wins: § 11 bars punishment for the same act, not separate, distinct criminal acts; the trial court’s dismissal order was unauthorized and prohibited |
| Whether Lawson remains controlling precedent for § 11 analysis | Modern decisions (Davis and others) provide the correct test focusing on the relationship between crimes; Lawson is distinguishable | Lawson requires dismissal when multiple convictions arise from one transaction; trial court relied on Lawson | Court expressly overruled Lawson and endorsed the Davis approach focusing on whether crimes are separate acts or the same criminal act |
| Whether a writ of prohibition is appropriate to prevent enforcement of the trial court’s order | The State has no adequate alternative remedy and will be injured by enforced dismissal; prohibition proper | Trial court acted within its discretion under Lawson | Writ of prohibition granted: the trial court exceeded lawful authority by ordering dismissal under Lawson/§ 11 |
| Whether subsequent‑trial/double‑punishment concerns remain (double jeopardy/collateral estoppel) | These concerns can be addressed separately under double jeopardy/collateral estoppel doctrines if implicated | Not raised here; Lawson relied partly on preventing successive prosecutions | Court noted those doctrines remain available but not decided here; they are distinct from § 11 analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Lawson v. State, 484 P.2d 900 (1971) (previously held related burglary and robbery convictions were one transaction; now expressly overruled)
- Ziegler v. State, 610 P.2d 251 (1980) (burglary complete upon entry; distinct offenses with separate elements do not merge)
- Davis v. State, 993 P.2d 124 (1999) (adopted the proper § 11 analysis: focus on the relationship between crimes, not whether one was a means to another)
- Sanders v. State, 358 P.3d 280 (2015) (possession of one firearm cannot be punished under two different statutes for the same act)
- Head v. State, 146 P.3d 1141 (2006) (possession of drugs and possession of paraphernalia are separate criminal acts)
- Hale v. State, 888 P.2d 1027 (1995) (one act of intercourse cannot be charged as both rape and incest)
- Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319 (1995) (offenses occurring inside a residence after burglary is complete do not merge into a single transaction)