State v. Kirk
2020 Ohio 323
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background:
- Sergeant Ruehrwein observed Jeffrey Kirk near the dumpsters/loading area of a Dollar General attaching a large bandsaw to a bicycle and approached on routine patrol.
- Kirk had no physical ID, provided his name and SSN verbally; the officer told him, "I'll be back with [you] in a minute," then returned to his cruiser to run the information through LEADS.
- The officer learned Kirk was subject to an extradition warrant, returned, advised Kirk he would pat him down and secure him; Kirk fled, was captured, searched incident to arrest, and a vial of methamphetamine was found.
- Kirk moved to suppress, arguing he was unlawfully detained when the officer said, "I'll be back with [you] in a minute;" the trial court granted suppression, finding the remark converted the encounter into a seizure without reasonable suspicion.
- The State appealed; the appellate majority reversed, holding the remark did not convert the consensual encounter into a seizure (Fourth Amendment implicated only when the officer announced the pat-down), and therefore suppression was erroneous; the court declined to resolve Terry-stop justifications because the State had not defended on that theory below.
- Judge Piper concurred in the judgment but would have held the encounter was a valid Terry detention supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion (thus also reversing suppression) — i.e., he agreed with the result but on different reasoning.
Issues:
| Issue | State's Argument | Kirk's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the officer's statement "I'll be back with [you] in a minute" converted a consensual encounter into a Fourth Amendment seizure requiring reasonable suspicion | Encounter remained consensual; officer's words did not compel compliance | The statement implicitly detained Kirk; a reasonable person would not feel free to leave | Reversed trial court: statement alone did not convert the encounter into a seizure; seizure occurred only when officer announced pat-down |
| Whether evidence discovered should nevertheless be admissible because the warrant discovery was an independent/intervening source | Methamphetamine admissible because discovery flowed from the LEADS warrant check (intervening/independent source) | Suppression required because the illegal detention produced the discovery | Court did not address this argument (moot after reversal and State did not raise it before trial court) |
| Whether the encounter could be justified as a Terry investigative stop (reasonable, articulable suspicion) | State waived Terry argument on appeal (did not raise it below), so not defended | Kirk argued no reasonable suspicion justified detention | Majority declined to decide (waiver); concurring judge would have found reasonable suspicion and upheld detention under Terry |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk standard and categories of police-citizen encounters)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (objective "would a reasonable person feel free to leave" test for seizures)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (factors indicating a seizure: show of force, display of weapon, language, blocking path)
- United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2004) (words alone may create a seizure in certain contexts, notably post-stop instructions to remain)
- United States v. Rodriguez, [citation="485 F. App'x 16"] (6th Cir. 2012) (words must be evaluated in the totality of circumstances; "words alone may not be enough in every instance")
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable suspicion can be supported by otherwise innocent conduct when viewed in totality)
- United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2002) (social awkwardness or discomfort does not, by itself, transform an encounter into a seizure)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (distinguishes consensual encounters from detentions/arrests in Fourth Amendment analysis)