State v. Kinsey, 2019 Ohio 4248

Sept. 18, 2016: A large shootout occurred; an innocent bystander was struck by a bullet. Police recovered an M&P15 rifle from 931 Adams Street and the bullet that hit the victim.
Christopher Kinsey was at 931 Adams Street, wounded, and was immediately suspected; witnesses placed him with the rifle and one witness said they saw him fire it.
Same day Kinsey was charged with weapons-under-disability and receiving-stolen-property (to which he later pleaded guilty); he was not charged with felonious assault that day.
Ballistics testing by BCI confirming the bullet was fired from Kinsey’s rifle was completed June 1, 2017; Kinsey was indicted for felonious assault July 24, 2017.
Kinsey moved to dismiss under Ohio’s 270-day statutory speedy-trial rule (R.C. 2945.71); the trial court granted the motion, finding the delay exceeded 270 days.
The state appealed, arguing the ballistics report was not "new and additional" evidence and thus the speedy-trial clock began at arrest; the appellate court reversed, holding the ballistics report did reset the clock.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the post-arrest BCI ballistics report is "new and additional evidence" that restarts the 270‑day statutory speedy‑trial period for a subsequent felonious‑assault indictment	Ballistics was not new: the state already possessed the bullet and had probable cause from witness statements and recovered casings, so the speedy‑trial clock began at arrest	The state’s delay violated R.C. 2945.71 because more than 270 days elapsed between arrest and the felonious‑assault indictment	The ballistics report was new and additional evidence; the speedy‑trial clock reset when the subsequent indictment issued, so dismissal was error

State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67 (Ohio 1989) (if state knew facts at time of initial indictment, subsequent charges arise from same facts and share the original speedy‑trial timeframe)
State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108 (Ohio 1997) (announces the “new‑and‑additional‑evidence” rule for resetting speedy‑trial clock)
State v. Cooney, 124 Ohio App.3d 570 (1st Dist. 1997) (limits Baker where lab results merely confirm facts already known to police)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (constitutional speedy‑trial four‑factor balancing test)
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1977) (prosecutors may delay charging until they can reasonably prove guilt at trial)
City of Columbus v. Nappi, 5 Ohio St.2d 99 (Ohio 1966) (statutory speedy‑trial rights distinct in application from constitutional rights)