State v. Kinne
161 N.H. 41
N.H.2010Background
- February 1999, Grafton County grand jury indicted Kinne for conspiracy to commit robbery; indictment alleged overt acts but did not allege the statutory aggravating facts to elevate to class A felony.
- Kinne pleaded guilty to class A felony robbery in March 2000; plea papers stated the maximum 15 years, minimum 7.5 years.
- Plea colloquy occurred; court accepted plea and sentenced 3–10 years with two years minimum suspended and five years’ probation; State waived proof at plea/sentencing; elements not read to Kinne.
- Following parole violation, Kinne sought habeas relief arguing the indictment failed to allege class A elements and that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made.
- Superior Court treated the motion as habeas, held waiver barred the challenge to indictment, and denied relief; Coos County later denied petition; appeals consolidated.
- Court ultimately held that Kinne waived the indictment challenge and failed to substantiate a collateral challenge to his plea; affirmed the rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of indictment challenge valid? | Kinne argues indictment insufficiency and collateral attack allowed | State contends waiver bars challenge; defect evident on face | Waiver valid; challenge rejected |
| Collateral attack on guilty plea valid if not advised of essential elements? | Kinne claims plea invalid for not knowing elements of class A robbery | Record shows counsel explained elements; form signed acknowledging class A plea | Pleas presumed valid; no sufficient showing of involuntary/unknowing plea |
| Habeas corpus as substitute for direct appeal? | Habeas allowed due to later discovery of defect | Procedural default bars habeas relief absent exceptional showing | Habeas not a substitute for direct appeal; default rules apply; no exceptional showing found |
| Effect of Humphrey/ Pepin/ Crosby on default rule in this context? | Claims based on defective indictment could be reviewed collaterally | Pepin/Reconciliation limits Humphrey; default applies unless ineffectiveness claims | Pepin-applied; Humphrey not controlling; no basis to circumvent default; no ineffectiveness claim here |
Key Cases Cited
- Sleeper v. Warden, NH (2007), 155 N.H. 160 (2007) (habeas review after direct appeal may occur for constitutional harms)
- Avery v. Cunningham, NH (1988), 131 N.H. 138 (1988) (habeas not substitute for direct appeal; procedural default applies)
- Humphrey v. Cunningham, NH (1990), 133 N.H. 727 (1990) (collateral review allowed for certain ineffective-assistance claims)
- Pepin v. State, NH (2009), 159 N.H. 310 (2009) (limits Avery; ineffective-assistance claims not procedurally barred on direct review)
- Crosby v. Warden, NH (2005), 152 N.H. 44 (2005) (premature sentencing issues may be reviewed; not controlling for this case)
- Thornton v. State, NH (1995), 140 N.H. 532 (1995) (defendant must understand essential elements for valid plea)
- Arsenault v. State, NH (2006), 153 N.H. 413 (2006) (circumstances for challenging a guilty plea collaterally; burden shifts based on trial court inquiry)
- Henderson v. Morgan, U.S. Supreme Court (1976), 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (due process requires understanding elements for a voluntary plea)
- Bradshaw v. Stumpf, U.S. Supreme Court (2005), 545 U.S. 175 (2005) (presumption of competent counsel informing defendant of plea terms)
- Allard v. Allard, NH (1976), 116 N.H. 240 (1976) (idea that court may rely on counsel's explanation of plea)
- Veale v. State, NH (2007), 154 N.H. 730 (2007) (ineffective-counsel claims preferred in collateral proceedings)
- United States v. Brooks, 7th Cir. (1997), 125 F.3d 484 (1997) (counsel’s explanation can justify plea if record supports it)