State v. King, 278 Or. App. 65

Defendant (22) met the victim (13 at first meeting; 14 at later contact) and exchanged phone numbers; he knew her age.
They exchanged sexually charged text messages over time (compliments, statements of arousal, invitations).
In response to the victim asking what they would do, defendant texted: “Anything you want. I really wanna bang [you]. no lie.” He admitted “bang” commonly means sexual intercourse.
Defendant was charged with luring a minor under ORS 167.057, alleging he furnished an “explicit verbal description of sexual conduct” to induce the minor to engage in sexual conduct.
At a bench trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal arguing the text did not contain a “description”; the trial court denied the motion and convicted him.
On appeal, the court applied the usual sufficiency-of-evidence standard and affirmed, interpreting “explicit verbal description” to include words intended to bring a graphic sexual image to the minor’s mind.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendant’s text constituted an “explicit verbal description of sexual conduct” under ORS 167.057	Text “I really wanna bang you” was an explicit verbal description intended to bring a graphic sexual image and thus meets the statute	The message named or identified sexual conduct but did not describe it; a description requires more detail than naming	Affirmed: The court held that a statement intended to produce a graphic sexual image (even concise language like “wanna bang”) can be an explicit verbal description under the statute

State v. King, 307 Or. 332 (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to the state)
State v. Cunningham, 320 Or. 47 (same evidentiary standard applied)
State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or. 46 (bench-trial standard referenced)
State v. Allison, 325 Or. 585 (bench-trial and motion standards)
State v. Jones, 223 Or. App. 611 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68 (use of context in statutory construction)
State v. Newell, 238 Or. App. 385 (different statutory terms presumed to have different meanings)