State v. King
2014 Tenn. LEXIS 351
| Tenn. | 2014Background
- Defendant Kiara King (age 19) pled guilty to aggravated burglary (Class C) and theft over $500 (Class E) based on her role as the getaway driver; co-defendants entered the victim’s home and a firearm was displayed during the crime.
- At sentencing the trial court imposed Range I concurrent sentences (5 years and 1.5 years) to be served on probation and denied judicial diversion.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, applying a presumption of reasonableness to the denial of diversion and holding that Bise/Caudle changed procedural requirements from Parker/Electroplating.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to clarify the appellate standard for judicial diversion and to review both sentence length and the denial of diversion.
- The Supreme Court held that Bise/Caudle’s abuse-of-discretion-with-presumption standard applies to judicial diversion decisions, but Parker and Electroplating’s requirement that the trial court consider and place on the record the diversion factors remains intact; because the trial court failed to articulate those factors the presumption did not apply here, so the Court conducted a de novo review and affirmed the denial of diversion.
Issues
| Issue | King’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the within‑range sentence lengths were excessive | King: Court failed to articulate reasons; sentences disproportionate compared to co‑defendants; minimums warranted | State: Sentences within range and trial court considered relevant factors; presumption of reasonableness applies | Court: No abuse of discretion; presumption applies and record sufficiently shows sentencing considerations; sentences affirmed |
| Whether Bise/Caudle standard applies to judicial diversion | King: Denial of diversion should not get presumption of reasonableness | State: Bise/Caudle apply and presumption should attach | Court: Bise/Caudle standard applies to diversion decisions, but only when trial court articulates consideration of Parker/Electroplating factors on the record |
| Whether Parker/Electroplating factors were abrogated by Bise/Caudle | King: Bise/Caudle abrogated strict Parker/Electroplating requirements | State: Trial court need not follow Parker formalities if Bise presumption applies | Court: Parker and Electroplating remain required; trial court must consider and place these factors on the record before presumption attaches |
| Whether denial of judicial diversion was erroneous here | King: Trial court abused discretion in denying diversion | State: Record supports denial (knowledge of plan, firearm used, inconsistent statements, failure to accept responsibility) | Court: After de novo review (presumption inapplicable because trial court failed to articulate Parker factors), denial upheld on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012) (adopts abuse‑of‑discretion review with presumption of reasonableness for within‑range sentences)
- State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012) (applies Bise principles to sentencing review)
- State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996) (identifies the common‑law diversion factors a trial court should consider)
- State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1998) (requires trial court to weigh diversion factors and explain reasoning on the record)
- State v. Schindler, 986 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1999) (describes judicial diversion as legislative largess and explains statutory framework)
- State v. Turco, 108 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. 2003) (discusses judicial diversion is not a sentence but is a trial‑court discretionary decision)
- State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995) (sets Wilkerson factors required when classifying a defendant as a dangerous offender for consecutive sentencing)
- State v. Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 163 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1993) (requires trial court explanation on the record after weighing diversion factors)