State v. King, 392 P.3d 997

Victim’s truck was stolen; wife (Wife) later saw a white‑shirted, shaved‑head driver in a truck and reported it. Police located the truck; officer (Officer) observed a white male in a white tee shirt, pursued the truck, lost and then found it parked; the driver fled and was later captured near a residence and identified as Defendant, Levi King.
At the arrest scene both Officer and Wife made identifications via single‑suspect showups (no multi‑person lineup); Wife’s iPod was found on Defendant’s person.
Defendant testified he bought the iPod from an acquaintance ("Kyle") who then fled, and admitted he fled from police rather than stop.
Trial counsel declined to call or consult an eyewitness‑identification expert, arguing the expert testimony likely would have reinforced, not undermined, the State’s identifications given facts (daylight, same‑race witnesses, unobstructed view, no weapon). Trial counsel also raised but later acquiesced to courtroom measures about officer placement and logistics for Defendant’s testimony.
Jury convicted Defendant of two theft counts and failure to stop; on Rule 23B remand the trial court found counsel’s decision to forgo expert testimony was a conscious, strategic choice and that record did not show visible restraints or prejudicial officer placement during the evidence phase.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (King)	Held
1. Whether counsel was ineffective for not calling an eyewitness‑identification expert	Counsel’s strategic choice was reasonable; expert likely would have hurt defense.	Failure to call/consult expert was deficient and prejudicial because identification pitfalls existed.	Counsel’s decision was reasonable trial strategy; no ineffective assistance.
2. Whether counsel failed to investigate by not consulting an expert	Trial counsel was experienced and familiar with Clopten factors; no further consultation required.	Counsel had a duty to investigate and consult an expert before deciding.	No deficiency: counsel made a reasonable, informed decision not to consult.
3. Whether the presence of a uniformed officer behind Defendant or visible restraints denied a fair trial	Presence was not obviously prejudicial; officer moved back after objection; record lacks showing of visible restraints.	Visible uniformed officer and handcuffs in front of jury prejudiced Defendant’s right to be tried as presumed innocent.	Claims unpreserved; no plain error shown; no record evidence of visible restraints during testimony.
4. Cumulative‑error claim	Cumulative errors undermined trial fairness.	Multiple errors (identification expert, restraints, officer presence) cumulatively prejudiced trial.	No individual errors found; cumulative‑error doctrine not invoked.

State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2009) (expert testimony on eyewitness identification can aid juries but may sometimes increase conviction risk)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (U.S. 1986) (presence of uniformed officers in courtroom does not automatically create prejudice)
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (addresses suggestiveness of single‑suspect showup)