460 P.3d 1020
Or. Ct. App.2020Background
- Keys was arrested for felony possession of methamphetamine and charged by information (no grand-jury indictment).
- At arraignment appointed counsel told the court she would "waive preliminary hearing" without explaining the right or confirming Keys’ understanding.
- No preliminary hearing occurred; the state proceeded, Keys later waived a jury and was convicted on stipulated facts.
- On appeal Keys argued the conviction is void because there was no indictment, no preliminary hearing, and no knowing personal waiver of either.
- The State did not argue that counsel’s on-the-record waiver amounted to Keys’ knowing personal waiver; the court therefore assumed the waiver was invalid.
- The Court of Appeals held that, absent indictment, a magistrate probable‑cause hold, or a defendant’s knowing waiver, the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction to try or convict Keys and reversed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Keys' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a felony conviction is valid when charged by information without indictment, preliminary hearing, or a knowing personal waiver | Relies on Sheppard/Barnes to say absence of a preliminary hearing can be non‑jurisdictional and waived by proceeding | Conviction void because no indictment, no preliminary hearing, and no knowing personal waiver; court lacked jurisdiction | Court: In felony cases, jurisdiction to try/convict attaches only after indictment, a magistrate probable‑cause hold following a preliminary hearing, or a defendant’s knowing waiver; absent those, conviction is void; reversal required |
| Whether defense counsel’s on‑the‑record statement waiving the preliminary hearing constituted Keys’ knowing waiver | (State did not argue counsel’s waiver was effective) | Counsel’s unilateral waiver was not Keys’ knowing, personal waiver because counsel didn’t advise or confirm Keys’ understanding | Court treated counsel’s waiver as ineffective; assumed waiver invalid under Article VII, §5 |
| Whether Sheppard/Barnes control and permit waiver by proceeding or plea | Argues Sheppard (and Barnes) support nonjurisdictional treatment and waiver by failing to object or by plea | Relies on Huffman and cases holding lack of indictment/waiver renders conviction void and non‑waivable | Court distinguished Sheppard (initial prelim hearing vested jurisdiction) and overruled Barnes to the extent it suggests absence of indictment/prelim/waiver is waivable |
| Whether defects in charging instruments differ from absence of indictment/waiver for jurisdictional purposes | Defects in indictments/informations are not jurisdictional (Terry) | Absence of indictment or valid waiver is jurisdictional and fatal | Court: Charging defects do not deprive jurisdiction; an actual absence of indictment, magistrate probable‑cause hold, or knowing waiver does deprive court of authority to try/convict |
Key Cases Cited
- Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283 (1952) (held that, absent indictment or valid personal waiver, judgment on information is void)
- State v. Sheppard, 35 Or. App. 69 (1978) (treated lack of a second preliminary hearing as nonfatal where an initial magistrate probable‑cause determination had occurred)
- Barnes v. Cupp, 44 Or. App. 533 (1980) (previously suggested plea could cure absence of preliminary hearing; Court of Appeals here limits/overrules to extent inconsistent)
- State v. Terry, 333 Or. 163 (2001) (defect in an indictment is not a subject‑matter jurisdictional defect)
- State v. Kuznetsov, 345 Or. 479 (2008) (describes constitutional role of grand juries and magistrates as checks on prosecutorial power)
- United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (federal precedent holding defects in indictments do not necessarily deprive a court of power to adjudicate)