State v. Kevin Lynch
156 A.3d 1012
| N.H. | 2017Background
- Defendant Kevin Lynch was interviewed at the Exeter police station after a three-year-old child alleged he assaulted her; Lynch waived Miranda rights, spoke, and later made incriminating statements on videotape.
- At the suppression hearing, the State conceded the interview was custodial; the trial court denied Lynch’s motion to suppress his statements.
- Approximately an hour into the interview Lynch said, “I guess the only thing I can do is probably stop talking and get a lawyer,” after which the detective repeatedly asked whether he wanted to stop and get an attorney; Lynch ultimately agreed to continue talking and made admissions.
- At trial the State introduced testimony from Dr. Gwendolyn Gladstone (a pediatrician/child-abuse specialist) recounting the victim’s out-of-court statements as statements made for medical diagnosis/treatment under NHRE 803(4).
- The jury acquitted Lynch of second-degree assault, convicted him of three counts of misdemeanor simple assault based on three alleged injuries; post-verdict the trial court dismissed two convictions on double jeopardy/unit-of-prosecution grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lynch) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lynch invoked Miranda right to counsel or to remain silent, requiring cessation of questioning | Ambiguous or equivocal remarks do not invoke rights; officer properly clarified and continued questioning | Lynch’s comment that he should “stop talking and get a lawyer” was an invocation that police failed to honor | Court: Statement was ambiguous (uses "guess"/"probably"), detective permissibly clarified; no Miranda violation |
| Whether officer’s repeated clarification impermissibly waived invocation or improperly pressured defendant | Clarifying questions are proper police practice when invocation is ambiguous | Repeated questioning showed failure to scrupulously honor invocation and discouraged assertion of rights | Court: Detective did not discourage invocation; repeatedly sought a clear decision—conduct was proper |
| Admissibility of victim’s out-of-court statements to treating physician under NHRE 803(4) | Statements were made in hospital to a treating pediatrician, within regular doctor-patient setting and temporally proximate to injury—admissible | Victim (3 y/o) did not necessarily understand the medical purpose; statements untrustworthy and not shown to be for treatment | Court: Admission affirmed — child’s prior relationship with doctor, hospital setting, contemporaneity, and content support treatment purpose and trustworthiness |
| Whether multiple simple assault convictions (three injuries) violate double jeopardy / correct unit of prosecution | Each distinct bodily injury can be a separate unit of prosecution even if from one act | Unit of prosecution is the single act causing bodily injury; multiple punishments for one act violate double jeopardy | Court: Unit of prosecution is each act causing bodily injury; trial court properly dismissed two convictions (single act produced multiple injuries) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings and cessation if suspect indicates desire to remain silent or have counsel)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (invocation of right to counsel must be clear and unambiguous; ambiguous references permit clarification)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (standards for invoking right to remain silent align with invocation of counsel principles)
- State v. Munroe, 161 N.H. 618 (2011) (three-part test for admitting statements under NHRE 803(4) when declarant is a child)
- State v. Gribble, 165 N.H. 1 (2013) (State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that custodial interrogation complied with Miranda)
- State v. Locke, 166 N.H. 344 (2014) (discussing double jeopardy/unit-of-prosecution analyses under State Constitution)